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t denotes a discrete time step. bt is the value of variable b at time t. When unambiguous,
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∆(B) is the set of distributions over finite set B. For β ∈ ∆(B), B ∼ β denotes that
the random variable B is drawn according to distribution β. Pβ[E] is the probability
of event E under distribution β. β[b] denotes the quantity Pβ[B = b]. Eβ[B] is the
expected value of B under distribution β.
I is a set of agents and i denotes one agent. −i represents the set of all agents
excluding agent i, i.e., I \ {i}. If Bi is a set associated with agent i, B denotes the
Cartesian product
∏
i∈I Bi. If bi is a variable associated with agent i, b denotes the
tuple
(




ABEE analogy-based expectation equilibrium 70, 71
EEE empirical-evidence equilibrium 1, 2, 93, 98, 99, 102–104, 112, 115–117, 119–123
EEO empirical-evidence optimum 88, 93, 98
MDP Markov decision process x, 2, 39–46, 49–52, 54, 60–62, 65, 68, 72, 74–77, 82,
83, 85–87, 93, 100, 101, 103, 120
MFE mean-field equilibrium 72, 73, 121
POMDP partially observable Markov decision process x, 1, 48, 49, 60, 65, 74, 75,
120




The objective of this research is to develop the framework of empirical-evidence
equilibria (EEEs) in stochastic games. This framework was developed while attempting
to design decentralized controllers using learning in stochastic games. The overarching
goal is to enable a set of agents to control a dynamical system in a decentralized
fashion. To do so, the agents play a stochastic game crafted such that its equilibria
are decentralized controllers for the dynamical system. Unfortunately, there exists no
algorithm to compute equilibria in stochastic games. One explanation for this lack
of results is the full-rationality requirement of game theory. In the case of stochastic
games, full rationality imposes that two requirements be met at equilibrium. First,
each agent has a perfect model of the game and of its opponents’ strategies. Second,
each agent plays an optimal strategy for the POMDP induced by its opponents’
strategies. Both requirements are unrealistic. An agent cannot know the strategies of
its opponents; it can only observe the combined effect of its own strategy interacting
with its opponents’. Furthermore, POMDPs are intractable; an agent cannot compute
an optimal strategy in a reasonable time. In addition to these two requirements,
engineered agents cannot carry perfect analytical reasoning and have limited memory;
they naturally exhibit bounded rationality. In this research, bounded rationality is
not seen as a limitation and is instead used to relax the two requirements. In the
EEE framework, agents formulate low-order empirical models of observed quantities
called mockups. Mockups have unmodeled states and dynamic effects, but they
are statistically consistent; the empirical evidence observed by an agent does not
contradict its mockup. Each agent uses its mockup to derive an optimal strategy.
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Since agents are interconnected through the system, these mockups are sensitive to
the specific strategies employed by other agents. In an EEE, the two requirements are
weakened. First, each agent has a consistent mockup of the game and the strategies
of its opponents. Second, each agent plays an optimal strategy for the MDP induced
by its mockup. The main contribution of this dissertation is the use of modeling to
study stochastic games. This approach, while common in engineering, had not been
applied to stochastic games. This dissertation is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 presents background material on game theory. The notions of best re-
sponse, solution concept for a game, and equilibria are at the heart of this chapter. The,
often overlooked, distinction between correlated equilibria and correlated-equilibrium
distributions is also made. Finally, a proof of the existence of Nash equilibria is given.
This proof has been crafted to make the proof of the existence of EEEs, which is
presented later, as intuitive as possible.
Chapter 3 presents repeated games and stochastic games. Their introduction relies
on the notions presented in Chapter 2 and on dynamic programming. Using the
vocabulary of MDPs makes the topics of sequential rationality and folk theorem in
repeated games easier to grasp.
Chapter 4 presents existing results concerning decentralized control and game
theory. Three main classes of results are addressed: learning in games, equilibria in
repeated games, and use of bounded rationality.
Finally, Chapter 5 introduces EEEs and presents results in this framework. The
presentation starts by analyzing a single-agent problem. In this setup, the notions of
consistency and optimality are defined. These notions are then extended to encompass
stochastic games. The second part of this chapter highlights three important results in
the EEE framework. First, the existence of EEEs is proven. Second, a characterization
of EEEs in perfect-monitoring repeated games is given in terms of correlated equilibria.





Decision making is the rational process of finding the best action given the information
available. An agent is given a set of actions A and preferences over these actions.
Preferences are expressed by a utility function u : A → R, such that for two actions a
and a′ in A, the following two properties hold:
• The agent prefers a over a′ if and only if u(a) > u(a′).
• The agent is indifferent between a and a′ if and only if u(a) = u(a′).
The utility of an action can be interpreted as a payoff that the agent wants to maximize.
The agent can also make nondeterministic decisions. Instead of committing to
a specific action, it can choose a mixed action. In game-theoretic terms, a mixed
action α is a distribution over the action set, i.e. an element of ∆(A). Similarly, the
actions in the original action set are often called pure actions. A mixed action’s payoff
is the expected value of the payoffs of the pure actions in its support. For example,
choosing a with probability 1
3
and a′ with probability 2
3





As a result, the domain of the utility function can be unambiguously extended from
the action set A to distributions over the action set ∆(A), i.e. u : ∆(A)→ R. For an
element α in ∆(A), u(α) = EA∼α[u(A)]. Therefore, given a utility function, solving a




Note 1 (Von Neumann–Morgenstern Utility Theorem). The representation of prefer-
ences by utility functions was characterized by von Neumann and Morgenstern [44].
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They proved that rational preferences can always be represented by a utility function to
be maximized in expectation and that the utility function is unique up to a positive affine
transformation. Preferences are rational if they satisfy four axioms: completeness,
transitivity, continuity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. Human decision
makers might not verify these axioms, but engineered agents can always be designed to
verify them. Insuring the validity of these axioms is therefore not a concern for this
research.
Formally, a preference is a total order on distributions over actions. Such a binary
relation is classically represented by the infix operator . Given two distributions α
and β, the fact that the agent prefers α to β is denoted by α  β. This preference is
not strict and the agent could in fact be indifferent between α and β if β  α is also
true. The four axioms of rational preferences are defined as follows:
Completeness Given two distributions α and β, then α  β or β  α.
Transitivity Given three distributions α, β, and γ such that α  β and β  γ,
then α  γ.
Continuity Given three distributions α, β, and γ such that α  β  γ, there
exists p ∈ [0, 1] such that β = pα + (1− p)γ.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives Given three distributions α, β, and γ
such that α  β and p ∈ [0, 1], then pα + (1− p)γ  pβ + (1− p)γ.
2.2 Games and Nash Equilibria
In a game setting, a set of agents I faces decision-making problems. Each agent i
in I has an action set Ai and a utility function ui : A → R, where A =
∏
i∈I Ai is
called the joint action set. Note that this utility function for agent i depends on the
actions of all the agents and not only its own. The tuple composed of all these utility
functions u = (ui)i∈I defines a game. As mentioned earlier, decision making is the
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rational process of finding an optimal action given the information available. There
is no obvious way to extend that definition to the multiagent setting. Preferences of
different agents cannot be aggregated; therefore, the notion of optimality for the set
of agents is ill defined.
Optimality for an individual agent is still well defined. Denote the opponents of
agent i by −i = I \ {i}. For fixed actions of its opponents, agent i faces a decision-
making problem. The actions in Ai optimal for the fixed actions of −i are called best
responses of agent i. Let a−i =
(
a1, a2, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , a|I|
)
denote a tuple of |I|−1
actions corresponding to one action for each opponent of agent i. The set of all such
actions A1 ×A2 × · · · × Ai−1 ×Ai+1 × · · · × A|I| is called the joint action set of the
opponents of agent i and is denoted by A−i. For a fixed a−i, the best-response set of
agent i is BRi(a−i) = arg maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a−i), a subset of Ai.
Note 2 (Set-valued Functions and Correspondences). The mapping BRi : A−i → 2Ai
is a set-valued function. It takes an element in A−i and returns a subset of Ai. The
set of subsets of Ai is called the power set of Ai. This power set is commonly denoted
by 2Ai. For each joint actions of agent i’s opponents a−i ∈ A−i, BRi(a−i) contains one
or more actions of agent i that are optimal against a−i. In particular, it never returns
an empty set. Set-valued functions with this property are called correspondences.
Correspondences f : A → 2B from A to subsets of B have similarities with func-
tions from A to B. The classical notation for correspondences f : A ⇒ B empha-
sizes these similarities. With this notation, the best-response correspondence is such
that BRi : A−i ⇒ Ai.
Theorems about functions often have correspondence counterparts. For exam-
ple, Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem is an extension of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem.
Brouwer’s theorem proves the existence of fixed points for continuous functions on
convex compact sets. Kakutani’s theorem replaces continuity by a set of conditions on
the graph of a correspondence to reach a similar conclusion. These theorems will be
5
used to prove the existence of equilibria in Section 2.5
2.2.1 Pure Nash Equilibrium
A joint action that is simultaneously a best response for all the agents is a reasonable
candidate to replace optimality in the multiagent setting. This concept, at the core
of game theory, is called a Nash equilibrium. A joint action a ∈ A is a pure Nash
equilibrium if and only if for all i ∈ I, ai ∈ BRi(a−i).
Defining an optimal action in a single-agent decision-making problem is straight-
forward and unambiguous. Given a utility function, an action is optimal if and only if
it maximizes this utility function. There are many ways to illustrate what optimality
means, and the following story is one of them. Consider a rational agent facing a
decision-making problem. Suppose the agent knows the utility function associated
with its rational preferences. The agent is asked to submit an action. Then, the agent
is asked if, given the circumstances, it is satisfied with its choice. Obviously, the
answer is yes if and only if the action is a utility maximizer, i.e. an optimal action.
This story seems silly and does not add anything to the definition of optimality. In
particular, it is unclear why the notion of circumstances is introduced. However, this
kind of stories is key in defining game-theoretic solution concepts. In the present
context, the story is redundant because the notion of optimal action is intrinsic to the
decision-making problem.
Let’s now look at the story corresponding to the Nash equilibrium. It will help
shed some light on the so-called circumstances mentioned previously. Consider a
group of rational agents facing a game. Suppose each agent knows the utility function
associated with its rational preferences. Each agent is asked to submit a pure action
without discussing with the other agents. Then, each agent is asked, if given the
circumstances, it is satisfied with its action. In this context, the circumstances are the
actions of all the other agents. Agent i ∈ I is satisfied if and only if ai ∈ BRi(a−i).
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Therefore, all the agents are simultaneously satisfied if and only if the joint action is a
joint utility maximizer, i.e. a pure Nash equilibrium.
This story emphasizes that a pure Nash equilibrium is not an intrinsic solution
concept. Modifying some elements of the story would yield a different solution concept.
The three main characteristics leading to a Nash equilibrium are the following:
Independent action selection Communication between players is proscribed. As
a result, they choose their actions independently of each other. Note that
preventing communication is not intrinsic to the game.
Unilateral deviation Each agent is asked if it is happy given the other |I|−1 actions
are fixed. In other words, each agent is asked if it would prefer to unilaterally
deviate. Nothing in the formulation of the game emphasizes these unilateral
changes. The agents could, for example, deviate in pairs.
Static concept The solution concept defined is static. Each agent is asked if it is
satisfied with its action and the story ends. The agents do not choose a new
action and the process does not repeat. Using only a static solution concept is,
once again, not intrinsic to the game formulation. It is a common misconception
to see some notion of time in the story. This intuition to repeat the process
actually prefaces learning in games which is covered later on.
To find a Nash equilibrium, you do not necessarily have to use this story. You can
imagine receiving a joint action as the result of an optimization problem, that turns
out to be a Nash equilibrium. However, a joint action is a pure Nash equilibrium if
and only if it can be cast in this storyline. This last statement will be used shortly to
introduce a new solution concept that is not a Nash equilibrium.
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2.2.2 Mixed Nash Equilibrium
The definition of best response is readily extended to mixed actions. To do so, re-
member that the utility of a mixed action α ∈ ∆(A) is defined as u(α) = EA∼α[u(A)].
In the original definition of best response, there was nothing specific to pure ac-
tions. Let i be an agent. For a distribution over the joint action set of its op-




, define BRi(α−i) = arg maxαi∈∆(Ai) ui(αi, α−i). This




⇒ ∆(Ai). Note that the best-response





and not only product of independent distributions
∏
j∈−i ∆(Aj).
Note 3 (Distributions over Product Spaces). Let B1 and B2 be two finite sets associated
with two agents 1 and 2. Let β1 ∈ ∆(B1) and β2 ∈ ∆(B2) be distributions over these
sets. Agent 1 draws a sample b1 from β1. Agent 2 independently draws a sample b2
from β2. The resulting pair b = (b1, b2) is drawn according to distribution β, such
that β[b1, b2] = β1[b1]β2[b2]. This distribution β is called the product distribution of β1
and β2, denoted by β = (β1, β2). There are, however, more distributions over B1 × B2
than product distributions, i.e. ∆(B1)×∆(B2) ( ∆(B1 × B2). A distribution that is
not a product distribution cannot be written as a pair, nor as a tuple when working in
more than two dimensions.
Given a distribution β ∈ ∆(B1 × B2) the marginal distributions β1 and β2 over B1
and B2 are defined as follows:








In general, the marginal distributions alone are not enough to reconstruct the original
distribution. Product of independent distribution β = (β1, β2) are the exception since
the marginals coincide with β1 and β2 and are sufficient to recover β.
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Since βi represents either an element in a product distribution or a marginal, care
must be taken when this notation is encountered. The context will clarify which one is
meant.
Let’s conclude this note by making the meaning of the four most encountered
distribution sets in this research explicit:




= ∆(A) represents a distribution over the joint
action set. In this setting, αi is the marginal for agent i.
• An element α =
(




i∈I ∆(Ai) represents a product distribu-
tions over the action sets of the agents. It results from each agent independently
choosing a distribution over its own action set.




= ∆(A−i) represents a distribution over the
joint action set of the opponents of agent i.
• An element α−i =
(




j∈−i ∆(Aj) represents a
product distribution over the action sets of the opponents of agent i. It results
from each opponent of agent i independently choosing a distribution over its own
action set.
With this definition of the mixed best response correspondence, Nash equilibria
can be extended to agents playing mixed actions. To do so, we are going to repeat
the Nash equilibrium story making the required changes. Consider a group of rational
agents facing a game. Suppose each agent knows the utility function associated with its
rational preferences. Each agent is asked to submit a mixed action without discussing
with the other agents. Then, each agent is asked, if given the circumstances, it is
satisfied with its mixed action. In this context, the circumstances for agent i is the
product distributions created by the mixed actions of all the other agents α−i =(




j∈−i ∆(Aj). The answers are all yeses if and only
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if the joint mixed action is a joint utility maximizer, i.e. a mixed Nash equilibrium. More
succintly, a product of independent distributions α =
(





is a mixed Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i in I, αi ∈ BRi(α−i). A mixed Nash
equilibrium is often simply called a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, an either pure or
mixed Nash equilibrium is called a potentially mixed Nash equilibrium.
Nash proved the following fact which is a cornerstone of game theory. Any game
with a finite number of players choosing from finite actions sets has at least one,
potentially mixed, Nash equilibrium.
2.3 A Game Example
Let’s illustrate the game-theoretic concepts exposed so far on the following game
known as battle of the sexes. A couple, composed of a man ♂ and a woman ♀, is
planning a date. Each one chooses between two actions: going to a football game F





, where a♂ is the action chosen by the man and a♀ by the
woman. For example, (F,O) denotes that he chooses football and she chooses opera.
The man prefers to be with the woman rather than separated from her. If they
are together, he prefers football (F,F) to opera (O,O). If they are not together,
he is indifferent between football (F,O) and opera (O,F). The woman prefers to
be with the man rather than separated from him. If they are together, she prefers
opera (O,O) to football (F,F). If they are not together, she still prefers opera (F,O)
to football (O,F). Their preferences can be implemented by utility functions u♂ for
the man and u♀ for the woman with the following values:
u♂(F,F) = 2, u♂(O,O) = 1, u♂(F,O) = 0, u♂(O,F) = 0,
u♀(O,O) = 3, u♀(F,F) = 2, u♀(F,O) = 1, u♀(O,F) = 0.
(1)
The action sets and the utility functions of battle of the sexes are represented in a
10




F 2, 2 0, 1
O 0, 0 1, 3 .
(2)
The man’s action determines the row and the woman’s determines the column. Num-
bers in the cell are the utilities received: the first by the man and the second by the
woman. This is called the normal-form representation of the game.
To compute the best response of the man, fix the mixed action of the woman. A
mixed action of the woman randomizes between F and O. Since there are only two
actions, a single number p♀ ∈ [0, 1] is enough to describe the mixed action where she




. When the context
makes the distinction clear, p♀ denotes either this probability or the mixed action.
Note that she chooses a pure action for p♀ = 0 or p♀ = 1. When the woman plays p♀,









u♂(F,O) = 2p♀, (3)









u♂(O,O) = 1− p♀, (4)








indifferent between F and O; any combination of F and O is a best response to p♀ = 13 .








{F} if p♀ > 13 ,











The best response of the woman to the man’s action p♂ is computed in a similar




























The best responses are plotted in Figure 1. The intersections of the graphs
correspond to the Nash equilibria of the game. Battle of the sexes has three Nash
equilibria: two pure ones and one mixed. The pure Nash equilibria arise from the
man and the woman choosing the same event. The mixed one corresponds to the man
and the woman independently randomizing their choices with probabilities p♂ =
3
4

















Figure 1: Best responses and Nash equilibria for battle of the sexes. The man plays F with
probability p♂. The woman plays F with probability p♀. The solid line is the man’s best
response. The dashed line is the woman’s best response. The filled circles indicate the Nash
equilibria.
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2.3.1 A Different Story
In battle of the sexes, only one person is truly happy in each pure Nash equilibrium.
The man is not thrilled to be at an opera performance, neither is the woman at the
football game. The mixed Nash equilibrium seems more fair than the two pure ones.
Each person has a chance to go on his or her preferred date. However, they end up in
different locations most of the time. Figure 2 illustrates that more than half of the
































Figure 2: Distribution of the mixed Nash equilibrium for the battle of the sexes. The mixed
Nash equilibrium α is the product of two independent distributions α♂ and α♀. More than
half of the weight of distribution α is on (F,O) and (O,F) which are low-utility joint actions
for both players.
When facing the kind of incompatible decisions modeled by battle of the sexes,
humans sometimes have recourse to a coin toss. The man and the woman agree that
on heads they go to the football game and on tails they go to the opera performance.
Doing this induces a probability distribution focused on the high-utility joint actions,
as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Distribution for the battle of the sexes using a coin toss. This distribution puts















Introducing this coin toss in our equilibrium stories goes as follows. Consider two
rational agents facing a battle of the sexes. Suppose each agent knows the utility
function associated with its rational preferences. The agents agree to flip a coin to
decide of their action. They both know that the coin is unbiased and produces heads
and tails with probability one half. They both agree to play F if the coin comes out
as heads. They both agree to play O if the coin comes out as tails. Each agent is
asked two questions. First, given the circumstances, if the coin toss yields heads,
are you satisfied with your agreed action F. Second, given the circumstances, if the
coin toss yields tails, are you satisfied with your agreed action O. In this context,
the circumstances are the distribution over heads and tails induced by the coin and
the actions agreed upon by the opponent in case of heads and tails. The answers
are all yeses, which is the characteristic of another form of equilibrium introduced by
Aumann under the name correlated equilibrium [2,3]. Correlated equilibria will be
described formally in the next section. Observe that, in this example, the correlated
equilibrium maintains the fairness of the mixed Nash equilibrium and yields a higher
utility for both agents.
However, this course of actions does not induce a Nash equilibrium. Recall that
the Nash equilibrium story requires independence in the choice of actions. This
distribution over actions cannot be obtained as the product of two independent
distributions. Therefore, this is not a Nash equilibrium.
2.4 Equilibria
In the previous sections, Nash and correlated equilibria have been introduced and
illustrated. In the present section, these concepts are being more formally defined and
some of their properties proven.
A game is described by a set of agents, the action set of each agent, and a utility
function for each agent. All this information is encoded in the function u = (ui)i∈I
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defined as follows:









Since each agent is trying to maximize its one-time payoff, this type of games is called
one-shot games. As mentioned previously, one-shot games allow for mixed actions. In
this case, the utility function of each agent is canonically extended through the use
of expectation. The following note exposes a few canonical extensions allowing the
application of functions to distributions. From now on, these canonical extensions are
used implicitly when needed. For example, we will say that u : A → R|I| describes a
one-shot game. We will not mention explicitly mixed actions even though they are
allowed and their utility unambiguously defined through the canonical extension.
Note 4 (Canonical Extensions and Category Theory). We defined the utility function
for pure actions and later extended it to handle mixed actions through the use of
expectation. This extension is not restricted to utility functions. Let u : A → K, where
K is an R vector space. The domain of u can be extended to accommodate distributions
over A and yield ũ : ∆(A)→ K. For α ∈ ∆(A), define ũ(α) =
∑
a∈A α[a]u(a). This
extension only relies on the fact that K is a vector space on R and that probabilities
are real numbers. In particular, when u represents a utility, the vector space K is R
itself. Previously, we used the symbol u to represent both the original function and the
extension. This abuse of notation is common since this is the canonical extension.
We now explicit two other commonly used canonical extensions.
Let f be a function from A to B. The function f cannot readily be applied to
distributions over A. However, it can be extended to a function f̃ on distributions.
Function f : A → B is extended to function f̃ : ∆(A)→ ∆(B). Let α be a distribution
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over A. The extension works by associating to each element b ∈ B a probability equal
to the sum of probabilities of its preimages in α, i.e.





By abuse of notation, the symbol f represents the function from A to B, as well as
the extension to ∆(A).
Let g be a function from A to ∆(B), and α be a distribution over A. Define
g̃ : ∆(A)→ ∆(B) such that




as the extension to g. By abuse of notation, the symbol g represents the function
from A to ∆(B), as well as the extension to ∆(A). In fact, this derivation can be
seen as an application of the extension through expectation, since ∆(B) is an R vector
space.
The extensions of f and g have been called canonical. Looking at probability
distributions through the eye of category theory backs this claim. In a nutshell, category
theory is an extension of set theory. Set-theoretical algebraic structures, such as
monoids, have category-theoretical counterparts. In particular, two structures shed
light on the extensions. The extension of f is explained by the fact that probability
distributions form a functor. The extension of g by the fact that they form a monad.
The details about functors and monads are beyond the scope of this research, but the
interested reader is referred to [30, 41] for more information.
Category theory is mentioned here for two reasons. First, it is a tool making rea-
soning about probabilities easier. Second, this theoretical tool has practical implications
for programming with probability distributions. The programming implications are
explored in the following example.
Example 1 (Category Theory in Haskell). The programming language Haskell [1]
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has strong mathematical roots. As such, it is a very good tool for applied mathematics.
In particular, category theory is baked at the heart of Haskell; functors and monads
are handled natively. Below is a toy example demonstrating this fact.
Let A = {a1, a2} and B = {b1, b2, b3} be two finite sets. Let




g : A → ∆(B)
a1 7→ b1
a2 7→ 0.15 b1 + 0.6 b2 + 0.25 b3





a2 a distribution over A.
This setup is translated in Haskell as follows:
data A = A1 | A2
data B = B1 | B2 | B3
f :: A -> B
f A1 = B3
f A2 = B1
g :: A -> ∆(B)
g A1 = [(B1, 1)]
g A2 = [(B1, 0.15), (B2, 0.6), (B3, 0.25)]
α :: ∆(A)
α = [(A1, 0.2), (A2, 0.8)]
Function application in Haskell is denoted by $. The following shows the result of
applying f to a1 and g to a2:
> f $ A1
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B3
> g $ A2
[(B1, 0.15), (B2, 0.6), (B3, 0.25)]
Applying a function in a functor context is represented by <$>. Applying it in a
monad context is represented by =<<. With these two notations, the functions f and g
can be applied to the distribution α as follows:
> f <$> α
[(B1, 0.8), (B3, 0.2)]
> g =<< α
[(B1, 0.32), (B2, 0.48), (B3, 0.2)]
Working with distributions in Haskell is easy. Note in particular that extensions
of f and g were not defined by the user. It might seem surprising since Haskell does
not know anything about probabilities. However, distributions form a functor and a
monad, therefore, Haskell was able to compute the extensions automatically. This
example shows how readable code is and how closely it follows mathematical notation.
A one-shot game is a model of interacting decision makers. When presented with
such a model, two questions come to mind.
The first is a descriptive one. What happens when rational agents play a game?
Game theory seeks to answer this question by defining and analyzing solution concepts.
In economics, stories, similar to the ones mentioned previously, are used to convince the
reader that a given solutions concept is appropriate for rational agents. Furthermore,
emphasis is placed on characterizing the set of payoffs achievable at equilibrium.
The second question is a prescriptive one. How should the game and the agents be
designed to reach a desired goal? This question is prevalent in the control and systems’
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approach to game theory. Solution concept are once again central but are not enough.
Algorithms reaching these solution concepts are also needed.
Most answers to these questions are framed in the context of non-cooperative
game theory. Non-cooperative game theory is a subset of game theory in which
agents are selfish and only interested in maximizing their own utility. The agents
understand the impact of other agents through actions. However, they would not
think of collaborating with other agents in order to jointly increase their utility. This
is why, the other agents are called opponents. In this context, a solution concept
corresponds to action profiles with no profitable unilateral deviation, also known as
equilibria. In this section, we show how different definitions of profitability give rise
to the most common equilibria for one-shot games. To start, we get back to the most
basic notion of profitability, best response.
Definition 1 (Best Response). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot game. Let i ∈ I
be an agent. The mapping
BRi : ∆(A−i) ⇒ ∆(Ai)
α−i 7→ arg max
αi∈∆(Ai)
ui(αi, α−i)
















is called the joint best-response correspondence for u.
This definition is a case where Note 3 is relevant. In the context of Definition 1,
α−1 represents the marginal distribution of α for agent 1. Armed with this definition
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of best response, we can formally define Nash equilibria.
Definition 2 (Nash Equilibrium). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot game. Let αi ∈
∆(Ai) be a distribution over action space Ai for agent i.
The distribution α = (αi)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) is a Nash equilibrium for u if and only
one of the three following equivalent conditions is verified:
• The distribution α is a fixed point of the joint best-response correspondence for u,
i.e. α ∈ BR(α).
• For all i in I, αi ∈ BRi(α−i).
• For all i in I and a′i in Ai, EA∼α[ui(Ai, A−i)] ≥ EA∼α[ui(a′i, A−i)].
The second classical solution concept developed for one-shot games is the correlated
equilibrium. In the battle of the sexes example, we mentioned that correlated equilibria
expand the notion of Nash equilibria from product distributions in
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) to




. Before introducing the
concept of correlated equilibrium, we need to introduce the closely related concept of
correlated-equilibrium distribution. The intuition behind correlated equilibria is made
clear in the upcoming Proposition 1.
Definition 3 (Correlated-equilibrium Distribution). Let u : A → R|I| describe a
one-shot game. Let α ∈ ∆(A) be a distribution over joint actions.
The distribution α is a correlated-equilibrium distribution for u if
∀i ∈ I, ai ∈ Ai such that αi[ai] > 0, a′i ∈ Ai,
EA∼α[ui(ai, A−i) |Ai = ai] ≥ EA∼α[ui(a′i, A−i) |Ai = ai].
Every Nash equilibrium is a correlated-equilibrium distribution. However, the
converse is not true.
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Definition 4 (Correlated Equilibrium). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot game.
Let Ti be a set of types for agent i, and T =
∏
i∈I Ti be the resulting joint type
space. Let π ∈ ∆(T ) be a distribution over joint types. Let σi : Ti → ∆(Ai) be
a strategy for agent i, and σ be the resulting joint strategy. Consider a random
variable Θ drawn according to π. Construct the random vector A = (Ai)i∈I such
that for all i ∈ I, Ai = σi(Θi). The distribution of A is α, such that, for any joint
action a ∈ A, α[a] =
∑
θ∈T π[θ] · σ(θ)[a].
The pair (π, σ) is a correlated equilibrium for u if α is a correlated-equilibrium
distribution for u.
The types are sometimes called signals. The key feature separating Nash equilibria
from correlated equilibria is the potential correlation of the types. This is the
correlation of the types that make the conditional expectation in Definition 3 different
from the expectation in Definition 2. In the example of the coin toss for battle of the
sexes, the types were actually extremely correlated since they were identical. The
following example describes more interesting correlated signals and highlights how the
conditional distributions are computed.
Example 2 (Correlated Signals). Consider the following protocol to generate correlated
signals for two agents. A third party, independent of both agents, rolls a die. It then
sends a signal to each agent. Agent 1’s signal s1 is binary. It tells agent 1 if the die’s
value is Low (1, 2, or 3) or High (4, 5, or 6). Agent 2’s signals2 is ternary. It tells
agent 2 if the die’s value is Small (1 or 2), Medium (3 or 4), or Large (5 or 6). The




Signal s1 for agent 1
Signal s2 for agent 2
Figure 4: A pair of coupled signals generated from a die roll. Observing the signal received
by agent 1 gives some information concerning the signal received by agent 2. This information
is recovered through the application of Bayes’ rule.












Suppose both agents know the protocol. Therefore, they know the distribution of the
die and of the pair of signals. When an agent receives a signal it infers something about
the signal received by the other one. This inference is done through the application of
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Bayes’ rule. The following facts are inferred:
P[s1 = Low | s2 = Small] = 1,
P[s1 = High | s2 = Small] = 0,
P[s1 = Low | s2 = Medium] = 12 ,
P[s1 = High | s2 = Medium] = 12 ,
P[s1 = Low | s2 = Large] = 0,
P[s1 = High | s2 = Large] = 1,
P[s2 = Small | s1 = Low] = 23 ,
P[s2 = Medium | s1 = Low] = 13 ,
P[s2 = Large | s1 = Low] = 0,
P[s2 = Small | s1 = High] = 0,
P[s2 = Medium | s1 = High] = 13 ,
P[s2 = Large | s1 = High] = 23 .
(8)
The distinction between correlated equilibria and correlated-equilibrium distribu-
tions is not emphasized in the literature. This blurring is due to a previously mentioned
fact; the main focus of game theory in economics is to determine the set of payoffs
achievable at equilibrium. Since a correlated equilibrium is defined by the correlated-
equilibrium distribution it induces, the payoff sets of the two concepts are identical.
The following proposition reinforces that point and gives useful characterizations of
correlated equilibria.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of Correlated Equilibria). Let u : A → R|I| describe
a one-shot game. Let Ti be a set of types for agent i, and T =
∏
i∈I Ti be the resulting
joint type space. Let π ∈ ∆(T ) be a distribution over joint types. Let σi : Ti → ∆(Ai)
be a strategy for agent i, and σ be the resulting joint strategy.
The pair (π, σ) is a correlated equilibrium for u if and only if one of the following
three equivalent conditions is true:
(i) ∀i ∈ I, θi ∈ Ti, a′i ∈ Ai,
EΘ∼π[ui(σi(θi), σ−i(Θ−i)) |Θi = θi] ≥ EΘ∼π[ui(a′i, σ−i(Θ−i)) |Θi = θi]
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(ii) ∀i ∈ I, σ′i : Ti → ∆(Ai),
EΘ∼π[ui(σi(Θi), σ−i(Θ−i))] ≥ EΘ∼π[ui(σ′i(Θi), σ−i(Θ−i))]
(iii) ∀i ∈ I, ϕi : Ai → Ai,
EΘ∼π[ui(σi(Θi), σ−i(Θ−i))] ≥ EΘ∼π[ui(ϕi ◦σi(Θi), σ−i(Θ−i))]
Condition (i), introduced in [2], tests that for every signal, the action prescribed by
the strategy is optimal. This is the definition used in the battle of the sexes example.
Condition (ii), introduced in [40], tests the strategy against all the other possible
strategies. Condition (iii), introduced in [3], tests the strategy against the restricted
set of swap strategies. Swap functions ϕis make recommendations based on the action
prescribed by the strategies and not the full signal received.
Proof. The proof is split in the four following steps:
1. Condition (i) implies condition (ii).
2. Condition (ii) implies condition (iii).
3. Any pair (π, σ) verifying condition (iii) is a correlated equilibrium, i.e. induces a
correlated-equilibrium distribution.
4. Any correlated-equilibrium distribution α can be induced by a pair (π, σ) satis-
fying condition (i).
The actual proofs are the following:
1. Let (π, σ) be a pair satisfying condition (i). Let i ∈ I, σ′i : Ti → ∆(Ai), θi ∈ Ti,
and a′i ∈ Ai. By definition, the following inequality holds:
EΘ∼π[ui(σi(θi), σ−i(Θ−i)) |Θi = θi] ≥ EΘ∼π[ui(a′i, σ−i(Θ−i)) |Θi = θi].
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Multiply both sides of the inequality by PΘ∼π[Θi = θi], then sum over θi in Ti.
The left-hand side becomes∑
θi∈Ti
EΘ∼π[ui(σi(θi), σ−i(Θ−i)) |Θi = θi]·PΘ∼π[Θi = θi] = EΘ∼π[ui(σi(Θi), σ−i(Θ−i))].
Similarly, the right hand side yields∑
θi∈Ti
EΘ∼π[ui(a′i, σ−i(Θ−i)) |Θi = θi] · PΘ∼π[Θi = θi] = EΘ∼π[ui(a′i, σ−i(Θ−i))].
Therefore,
EΘ∼π[ui(σi(Θi), σ−i(Θ−i))] ≥ EΘ∼π[ui(a′i, σ−i(Θ−i))].
This inequality holds for any a′i. Therefore, the left-hand side is greater than
any convex combinations of the right-hand side. In particular, it is greater than∑
a′i∈Ai
EΘ∼π[ui(a′i, σ−i(Θ−i))] · PΘ∼π[σ′i(Θi) = a′i] = EΘ∼π[ui(σ′i(Θi), σ−i(Θ−i))],
which yields condition (ii).
2. Let (π, σ) be a pair satisfying condition (ii). Let i ∈ I and ϕi : Ai → Ai.
Using the functor extension from Note 4, the composition ϕi ◦σi is an element
of Ti → ∆(Ai). Therefore, condition (iii) is a direct consequence of condition (ii).
3. Let (π, σ) be a pair satisfying condition (iii). Let Θ be a random variable drawn
according to π and A the induced random variable over the joint action set.
Denote by α the distribution of A. Let i ∈ I, ai ∈ Ai such that αi[ai] > 0,
and a′i ∈ Ai. Define ϕ by ϕ(ai) = a′i and ϕ(a′′i ) = a′′i for all a′′i ∈ Ai \ {ai}.
Condition (iii) translates to
EA∼α[ui(Ai, A−i)] ≥ EA∼α[ui(ϕi(Ai), A−i)].
Applying the law of total probability for the left-hand side yields
EA∼α[ui(Ai, A−i) |Ai = ai]·PA∼α[Ai = ai]+EA∼α[ui(Ai, A−i) |Ai 6= ai]·PA∼α[Ai 6= ai],
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or, more concisely,
EA∼α[ui(ai, A−i) |Ai = ai] · αi[ai] + EA∼α[ui(Ai, A−i) |Ai 6= ai] · (1− αi[ai]).
Similarly, by using the definition of ϕi and the law of total probability, the
right-hand side is equal to
EA∼α[ui(a′i, A−i) |Ai = ai] · αi[ai] + EA∼α[ui(Ai, A−i) |Ai 6= ai] · (1− αi[ai]).
Subtracting EA∼α[ui(Ai, A−i) |Ai 6= ai] · (1− αi[ai]) from each side and then
dividing by α[ai], which is positive, gives the correlated-equilibrium distribution
condition for α.
4. Let α be a correlated-equilibrium distribution. For agent i ∈ I, define the types
to be its actions, Ti = Ai, and σi to be the identity function overAi. Furthermore,
let π = α. By definition, the distribution α satisfies the inequality in Definition 3.
This immediately translates in the pair (π, σ) verifying condition (i).
To conclude this section, we look at equilibria from a different perspective. In a
game setting, the actions taken by a set of agents induce a distribution α ∈ ∆(A)
over the joint action set. Equilibria are distributions in which no rational agent has
an incentive to unilaterally deviate. This means that defining an equilibrium concept
boils down to choosing the two following elements:
• A set of feasible distributions over the joint action set.
• A set of incentive constraints for each agent.
For example, a Nash equilibrium is a product distribution with the simple incentive
constraint from Definition 2. Similarly, a correlated-equilibrium distribution is an
unrestricted distribution with the conditional incentive constraint from Definition 3.
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It is natural to wonder what happens when looking at different combinations
of feasible distributions and incentive constraints. On the one hand, a product
distribution with the conditional incentive constraint is a Nash equilibrium, since the
independence renders the conditional superfluous. On the other hand, an unrestricted
distribution with the simple incentive constraint yields a new equilibrium concept
called a coarse correlated equilibrium.
Definition 5 (Coarse Correlated Equilibrium). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot
game. Let α ∈ ∆(A) be a distribution over joint actions.
The distribution α is a coarse correlated equilibrium for u if
∀i ∈ I, ∀a′i ∈ Ai, EA∼α[ui(A)] ≥ EA∼α[ui(a′i, A−i)].
Every correlated equilibrium distribution is a coarse correlated equilibrium. Indeed,
the inequality defining a coarse correlated equilibrium follows from the one defin-
ing a correlated-equilibrium distributions by multiplying each side of the inequality
by PA∼α[Ai = ai] and summing over ai ∈ Ai. This observation, along with the rela-
tionship between Nash equilibria and correlated-equilibrium distributions, is captured
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Hierarchy of Equilibria). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot game.
Let α ∈ ∆(A) be a distribution over joint actions.
If α is a Nash equilibrium for u, then α is also a correlated-equilibrium distribution
for u.
If α is a correlated-equilibrium distribution for u, then α is also a coarse correlated
equilibrium for u.
With the standard abbreviations for Nash equilibria (NE), correlated-equilibrium
distributions (CE), and coarse correlated equilibria (CCE), this proposition is written
concisely as follows:
NE ⊂ CE ⊂ CCE.
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This last proposition explains the importance of knowing that Nash equilibria
always exist. Indeed, the existence of Nash equilibria implies the existence of correlated-
equilibrium distributions and coarse correlated equilibria. Therefore, the following
section is dedicated to the proof of Nash’s seminal result. Elements of this proof will
be used to prove the existence of the solution concept introduced in this research.
2.5 Nash’s Existence Theorem
The existence of Nash equilibria was previously mentioned. Here is the formal
statement of this result.
Theorem 1 (Nash’s Existence [34]). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot game.
There exists a product distribution α ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) which is a Nash equilibrium
for u.
To prove it, we will use the definition of Nash equilibria in term of fixed points.
The best-response correspondence restricted to product distributions
∏





i∈I ∆(Ai). The set
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) is a product of finite
simplices and as such is non-empty, compact and a convex subset of an Euclidean
space. Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem is a classical result guaranteeing the existence
of fixed point for functions over this kind of sets.
Theorem 2 (Brouwer’s Fixed-point Theorem). Let X be a non-empty, compact and
convex subset of some Euclidean space. Let f : X → X be a continuous function.
Then f has a fixed point x∗ such that x∗ = f(x∗).
An illustration of this theorem is given in Figure 5. Kakutani’s fixed point theorem
is an extension to Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem dealing with correspondences instead
of functions. Figure 6 provides the corresponding illustration.
Theorem 3 (Kakutani’s Fixed-point Theorem). Let X be a non-empty, compact and
convex subset of some Euclidean space. Let f : X ⇒ X be a correspondence on X with
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a closed graph and the property that for all x ∈ X , f(x) is non empty and convex.
Then f has a fixed point, x∗ such that x∗ ∈ f(x∗).
The following definition explicits what a closed graph for a correspondence means.
Definition 6 (Correspondence with a Closed Graph). Let X be a non-empty, compact
and convex subset of some Euclidean space. Let f : X ⇒ X be a correspondence on X .
The graph of f is closed if and only if, for all converging sequence ((xt, yt))t∈N,








Figure 5: Illustration of Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem. The solid line is the graph of a
continuous function f from the interval [0, 1] to itself. The interval [0, 1] is a non-empty,
compact and convex subset of the Euclidean space R. The dashed line is the graph of the
identity function on the same interval. The filled circles correspond to fixed points of f .
Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem uses continuous functions on which we have a strong
grasp. It is a good stepping stone to understand Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem. The
core elements of these two fixed-point theorems are present in Brouwer’s theorem.
Kakutani’s theorem irons out the details for correspondences. Similarly, Theorem 1
is proven in two step. First, we use a function approximating the best-response
correspondence and apply Brouwer’s theorem to prove the existence of approximate









Figure 6: Illustration of Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem. The solid lines and the shaded
area represent the closed graph of a correspondence f from the interval [0, 1] to itself. For
all x ∈ [0, 1], f(x) is non empty and convex. The interval [0, 1] is a non-empty, compact and
convex subset of the Euclidean space R. The dashed line is the graph of the identity function
on the same interval. The filled circles and the bold segment correspond to fixed points of f .
Kakutani’s theorem and prove the existence of exact Nash equilibria. This approach
helps building insight about the Nash existence theorem.
2.5.1 Existence of Approximate Nash Equilibria
Every equilibrium definition includes an incentive constraint, which takes the form of
a maximization. Sometimes, the exact maximization is not required, and approximate
maximization is acceptable. For example, the definition of an approximate Nash
equilibrium is the following. Let ε > 0 be a small additive factor. A product
distribution α ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) is an ε Nash equilibrium for u if
∀i ∈ I, a′i ∈ Ai, EA∼α[ui(Ai, A−i)] ≥ EA∼α[ui(a′i, A−i)]− ε.
Correlated equilibria and coarse correlated equilibria are similarly extended to ε
correlated equilibrium and ε coarse correlated equilibria by relaxing the incentive
constraints by ε.
To prove the existence of an approximate Nash equilibrium, we use Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem for a Gibbs-smoothed best-response function.
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Definition 7 (Gibbs-smoothed Best Response). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot
game. Let i ∈ I be an agent. The function
GBRτi : ∆(A−i)→ ∆(Ai),












is called agent i’s Gibbs-smoothed best response with parameter τ for u.
The following note gives a little background about the Gibbs distribution.
Note 5 (Gibbs Distribution). The Gibbs distribution arises in statistical physics.
Consider a system made of a large number of particles. The system, as a whole, can
take configurations from the set X . In configuration x ∈ X , the energy of the system
is E(x). Nature seeks to minimize the energy of the system. However, the presence of
thermal noise creates a stochastic disturbance in this minimization process. The Gibbs
distribution characterizes this disturbance. Let T be the temperature of the system.










is the Boltzmann constant. For any non-zero temperature, the Gibbs distribution
assigns a positive probability to every configuration. As the temperature goes to infinity,
the distribution converges to the uniform distribution over X . As the temperature
decreases, the distribution puts more weight on the configurations of minimal energy.
In the limit, as the temperature approaches zero, the Gibbs distribution converges to
the uniform distribution over the configurations of minimal energy.
By making a couple of changes, the Gibbs distribution is relevant for decision
making. In a decision-making problem, the agent seeks an action a maximizing its









. As the parameter τ goes to zero, distribution Gτ concentrates
its weight on utility-maximizing actions. This property explains why, for small τ ,
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the Gibbs distribution is used to define a function approximating the best-response
correspondence.
The following proposition formalizes the fact that the Gibbs distribution approaches
an optimal distribution as the parameter goes to zero.
Proposition 3 (Approximate Optimality of the Gibbs Distribution). Let u : A → R
be a utility function over finite action set A with cardinality n = |A|. Let A∗ =
arg maxa∈A u(a) be the set of maximizers of u with cardinality n








u∆ = umax − umin,
uδ = umax − max
a∈A\A∗
u(a).










, and α the Gibbs distribution with








The distribution α is ε optimal for u.
Proof. We only consider the case where u is not a constant function. Therefore, the






> 0, and uδ > 0. This,
in turn, guarantees the existence of ε and τ satisfying the aforementioned constraints.
If the utility function is constant, any distribution is optimal and therefore ε optimal
for u.
The proof is straightforward. We compute u(α), compare it to umax, and show
that the difference umax − u(α) is smaller than ε. Let’s first, explicit u(α) and split
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uδ proves that α is ε optimal
for u.
Combining Definition 7 and Proposition 3 yields one possible definition for an
approximate best-response function.
Definition 8 (Approximate Best Response). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot
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game. Define the following quantities, for agent i ∈ I:



































. From now on, we will refer to this technical condition
as ε small enough for u. Define agent i’s ε best-response function for u by BRεi =












)) . As the name indicates, for α−i ∈ ∆(A−i), the















is called the joint ε best response for u.
By definition, the joint ε best response is approximately optimal. This is the first
condition required for proving the existence of approximate Nash equilibria. The
second condition needed is its continuity.
Proposition 4 (Continuity of the Approximate Best-response Function). Let u : A →
R|I| describe a one-shot game and ε small enough for u.
The joint ε best response for u is continuous.
Proof. The function BRε is vector valued. It is continuous if and only if it is compo-
nentwise continuous. Let i ∈ I be an agent. We need to prove that α 7→ BRεi (α−i) is
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continuous. The function α 7→ α−i is continuous. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove
that BRεi is continuous in order to prove that BR
ε is continuous.
The function BRεi takes values in ∆(Ai). It can be interpreted as a vector-valued
function, with as many entries as elements in Ai. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove












The mapping is therefore continuous as it is a composition of continuous functions:
expectation, division, exponential, and sum.
With the definition and proposition in place, we can now prove the existence of
approximate Nash equilibria.
Theorem 4 (Existence of Approximate Nash Equilibria). Let u : A → R|I| describe a
one-shot game and ε > 0.
The exists an ε Nash equilibrium for u.
Proof. A distribution α ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) forming a fixed point of the joint ε best response
for u, i.e. verifying α = BRε(α), is an ε Nash equilibrium for u. Therefore, proving
the existence of such a fixed point is a sufficient condition to proving the theorem.
As was previously mentioned, the set
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) is a product of finite simplices
and as such is non-empty, compact and a convex subset of an Euclidean space. The
joint ε best response for u is continuous. Therefore, by applying Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem, we conclude that such a fixed point exist.
2.5.2 Existence of Exact Nash Equilibria
This section is dedicated to the proof of Nash’s existence theorem. The proof of
Theorem 4 gives some intuition regarding the existence of Nash equilibria. The
following proof contains the details.
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Proof of Theorem 1. A distribution α ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) forming a fixed point of the joint
best response for u, i.e. verifying α = BR(α), is a Nash equilibrium for u. Therefore,
proving the existence of such a fixed point is a sufficient condition to proving the
theorem.
To apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem we need to prove the four following facts:
• The set
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) is non-empty, compact and a convex subset of an Euclidean
space.
• For α ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai), BR(α) is non-empty.
• For α ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai), BR(α) is convex.
• The best-response correspondence has a closed graph.
The first two facts are immediately proven. Once again, the set
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) is a
product of finite simplices and as such is non-empty, compact and a convex subset of
an Euclidean space. Let α ∈
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai). There exists a best response for each agent
which guarantees that BR(α) is non-empty.
We now prove that the set BR(α) is convex, for α a distribution in
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai).
Let i be an agent, βi and γi be two elements of BRi(α−i), and θ ∈ [0, 1]. Since βi
and γi are both best responses to α−i, it is the case that ui(βi, α−i) = ui(γi, α−i). By
linearity of the expectation, we conclude that
ui(βi, α−i) = ui(θβi + (1− θ)γi, α−i) = ui(γi, α−i).
As a result, the convex combination θβi + (1− θ)γi is also an element of BRi(α−i).
Therefore, the set BRi(α−i) is convex. The set BR(α) is the Cartesian product of
convex sets and as such is convex.
We finally prove that the best-response correspondence has a closed graph. Let α =
(αt)t∈N and β = (β
t)t∈N be sequences in
∏
i∈I ∆(Ai) such that for all t in N, βt ∈
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BR(αt). Suppose that α converges to α∗ and β converges to β∗. Let i be an agent
and ai an action for this agent. For t ∈ N, the fact that βt ∈ BR(αt) implies
















. The utility function
















. This fact is true for any agent and therefore BR
has a closed graph.
Everything is now in place to apply Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem and to conclude
that an exact Nash equilibrium always exists.
At first glance, it is easier to prove the existence of an exact equilibrium rather
than an approximate one. However, note that most of the approximate equilibrium





3.1 Markov Decision Processes
3.1.1 Setup
The problems analyzed up to this point were static; there was no notion of time. We
are now switching gears and turning to problems with dynamic. The simplest dynamic
problems are MDPs. In an MDP, a state evolves in discrete time controlled by an
action. The state at time t+ 1 is a random variable depending only on the state of the
system at time t and the action played at time t. The dynamic is described as follows:





where xt and xt+1 are states in a finite state space X , at is an action in a finite
action set A, and f is a state-transition function in X ×A → ∆(X ). This dynamic is
alternatively represented by the short notation
x+ ∼ f(x, a), (9)
where x and a are the state at the action at a given time step and x+ is the state at
the next time step.
At each time step t, the agent observes the state and chooses an action. Over time,
the agent accumulates some information. This sequence of states and actions is called
the history. The history up to time t is ht = (x0, a0, x1, a1, . . . , xt−1, at−1, xt). Denote
by Ht the set of histories up to time t and by H = ∪t∈NHt the set of all possible
histories. The information observable over an infinite run is called an infinite history.
The set of infinite histories is denoted by H∞.
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In state x, choosing action a yields a payoff v(x, a). The agent is interested in
maximizing its expected sum of discounted payoffs for a given discount factor δ ∈










Note that δt denotes δ to the power t whereas xt and at denote the state and the
action at time t.
Note 6 (Different Flavors of MDPs). MDPs are amongst the most studied dynamical
systems since Bellman’s seminal work on dynamic programming [4]. Multiple books
are devoted to their analysis [6, 35]. As a result, MDPs come in a variety of flavors.
These different flavors are described below with an emphasis on the one used in this
research:
Discrete Time In this research, the agent chooses an action at discrete-time steps.
There also exist continuous-time Markov decision processes. This shift to un-
countable spaces requires the use of more advanced measure theoretic tools to
define probabilities.
Finite State Space and Action Set In this research, the state space and the action
set of the agent are finite. This restriction guarantees that small enough problems
can be simulated and solved on a computer. Some MDP results carry over from
finite sets to countable sets. Some other problems use uncountable sets, such
as the continuous real line. As mentioned previously, analyzing these problems
require more advanced measure theoretic tools.
Single Action Set for All States In this research, at each time step and in each
state, the agent is allowed to use any of the actions in its action set. In some
problems, the action set is indexed by the state. In state x, the agent can choose
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an action in the set Ax. The analysis with a single action set is not more
restrictive but requires less notation.
Unconstrained Optimization In this research, the optimization performed by the
agent is unconstrained. The addition of constraints requires the use of additional
tools, such as Lagrange multipliers, to analyze the problems.
Infinite Horizon In this research, the cost is aggregated over an infinite time hori-
zon. Other classes of MDPs predetermine a final time T at which the process
stops. With a finite horizon, optimal strategies are computed by using backwards
induction. In the infinite horizon setup, backwards induction is not applicable.
However, a fixed-point property, described in the next section, replaces back-
wards induction. The game-theoretic literature strongly favors the use of infinite
horizon.
Absence of Termination State In this research, the process goes on forever. A
variation considers processes with a special state. If the process reaches this state,
the payoffs are tallied and everything stops. This is, once again, a notational
issue and the setup used in this research supersedes this variation.
Discounted Payoff In this research, the infinite stream of payoffs is aggregated
through the use of a discounted sum. The objective in some MDPs is the average
payoff. For finite-horizon problems this does not change anything. However, in
the infinite horizon case, a non discounted sum might not converge and more
technicalities have to be dealt with. Discounted payoffs are predominant in the
game-theoretic literature.
From now on, these characteristics are implied. Therefore, they will not be made
explicit for each MDP encountered.
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3.1.2 Strategies
In a static decision-making problem, as described in Section 2.1, the agent seeks to
maximize its one-time payoff. This payoff is the utility associated with its action.




In an MDP, the equivalent of this static utility function is the function V : H∞ → R
defined by (10). To determine the payoff of the agent, the entire infinite history h ∈ H∞




However, the agent cannot influence the history at will. The dynamic (9) imposes some
constraints on the possible histories. Instead of choosing directly a history, the agent
chooses a strategy, which is a plan of action for all the possible outcomes of the process.
A strategy σ determines at time t an action at depending on ht, the information
available to the agent at time t. As was the case in the previous chapter, this action
can also be mixed instead of pure. Therefore, a strategy is an element σ : H → ∆(A).










) ∣∣∣∣∣x0 = x
]
. (11)






Section 2.3.1 illustrates that equilibria are not intrinsic to a given static game. De-
pending on the story used, different solution concepts arise. For dynamic problems,
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some side information is similarly required. It is crucial to know the information
available to the agent at every time step.
In an MDP, the information available to an agent is two fold. First, the agent
knows some information a priori and keeps this knowledge all along. It knows the
dynamic of the world f and the causality relations in place. The main causality
relation is the impact of its action on the state evolution. Second, it accumulates some
information along the way. At each time step, the agent observes the action played
and the resulting state. At time t, it has accumulated the history ht. The information
















Figure 7: Agent information in an MDP. The dotted arrows materialize causality. A value
at the start of an arrow impacts the value at the end of this arrow. The agent knows all of
these causality relations, the transition function f , and at time step t it has observed ht.
The purpose of the gray highlights is solely to improve readability. They do not emphasize
specific values.
The type of diagram introduced in Figure 7 is central in this research. Indeed, the
solution concept introduced relies on tweaking the information available to the agents,
and these diagrams help visualizing the process.
3.1.4 Bellman’s Principle of Optimality





It is actually possible to look for a single strategy that is simultaneously optimal for ev-
ery initial state. As such, a solution to the MDP is an element of ∩x∈X arg maxσ∈Σ Uσ(x).
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It is not obvious that the maximum is attainable nor that the intersection is not empty.
Furthermore, recall that a strategy is a function from H to ∆(A). The domain of a
strategy H is infinite; therefore, the set of strategies Σ is infinite. As a result, looking
for a solution with an exhaustive-search method is in vain.
Bellman was the first to observe that the Markovian structure of the problem
gives structure to optimal strategies. He described this structure in his principle of
optimality [4]:
An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and
initial decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal
policy with regard to the state resulting from the first decision.
This simple principle has far-reaching consequences. The most important one guar-
antees that for any unconstrained discounted finite MDP, there exists a stationary
deterministic optimal strategy [35, Theorem 6.2.10]. A strategy is stationary if the
next action is computed using only the current state; the history leading to the current
state and the time are not used. A strategy is deterministic if the actions selected are
not mixed.
This result reduces the set of strategies to be considered to a finite number.
However, solving (11) for each of the |A||X | stationary deterministic strategies and
finding the maximum is prohibitively expensive. Once again, the Markovian structure
of the problem helps. There are more efficient ways to explore the solution space. As
the existence of a stationary policy indicates, the only information that really matters
in an MDP is the current state. The fact that there is no need to consider the entire
history is captured in Figure 8, which simplifies the agent’s knowledge diagram.
Bellman also gave a characterization of stationary deterministic optimal strategies.
This characterization relies on two concepts. First, for an MDP, there exists a
function U∗ : X → R called the value function of the problem. When using an optimal












Figure 8: Minimal agent information in an MDP. Bellman’s principle of optimality
guarantees it is enough to know the current state to act optimally. Tracking the entire history
of state-action pairs cannot yield a higher expected sum of discounted payoffs.
the Bellman operator











) ∣∣x, a]}}, (12)
which takes a function that looks like a value function and returns another such
function. Intuitively speaking, given an estimate of the value function U , a better
estimate is BU . Thanks to the discount factor δ being smaller than 1, the Bellman
operator B is a contraction mapping. It therefore has a unique fixed point. This
unique fixed point is the value function U∗. This result is known as the Bellman
equation
U∗ = BU∗. (13)
Given the value function U∗, a stationary deterministic strategy σ∗ satisfies, for all x
in X ,
σ∗(x) ∈ arg max
a∈A
{





) ∣∣x, a]}. (14)
This characterization is known as the one-shot deviation principle in the repeated
games literature. As this name suggests, it is sufficient to verify that the one-shot
action taken at each state is optimal to guarantee global optimality of the strategy.
3.1.5 Dynamic Programming
The astute reader noticed that the Bellman operator was not used in the characteriza-
tion of optimal strategies. However, it is central in the actual computation of such
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strategies through dynamic programming. Indeed, dynamic-programming algorithms
search the solution space by using the recursive structure of the Bellman equation.
These algorithms are more efficient than exhaustive-search algorithms but are under
the curse of dimensionality. The amount of computations required grows polynomially
with the sizes of the state space and action set. However, the size of MDPs solvable in
practice is limited. The two main dynamic-programming algorithms, value iteration
and policy iteration, are presented below.
3.1.5.1 Value Iteration
The value iteration algorithm uses the fact that the Bellman operator B is a contraction
mapping. On top of guaranteeing the existence of a fixed point, the contraction
mapping property also guarantees that the fixed point is found by repeated application




An actual algorithm yielding an ε optimal strategy is exposed in Algorithm 1. The
stopping condition guarantees that the returned strategy is ε optimal. See [35,
Theorem 6.3.1] for a detailed proof.
Algorithm 1 Value Iteration
procedure Value Iteration(U0, ε)
t← 0
repeat
for all x ∈ X do
U t+1(x)← BU t(x)
end for
t← t+ 1
until ‖U t − U t−1‖∞ ≤
ε(1−δ)
2δ
for all x ∈ X do





As the name suggests, the algorithm computes successive approximation of the value
function. The actual strategy is only computed at then end, once the approximation
of the value function is satisfactory.
3.1.5.2 Policy Iteration
The policy iteration algorithm takes a different approach by computing successive
strategies, also called policies. For a given strategy σ, the algorithm computes the
expected payoff from each state, encoded in the function Uσ : X → R. The next
strategy is computed by taking Uσ as the approximation of the value function.
To compute Uσ, the following operator is used:









This operator is related to the Bellman operator. For the same reasons, it is a
contraction mapping, and Uσ is computed by solving the equation
Uσ = BσUσ. (15)
Solving Bellman’s equation is difficult because of the maximization in the Bellman
operator. The lack of maximization makes solving (15) equivalent to a matrix inversion.
The resulting algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2.




Uσt ← the solution of the equation Uσt = BσtUσt
for all x ∈ X do
σt+1(x)← arg maxa∈A{u(x, a) + δEf [Uσt(x+) |x, a]}
end for
t← t+ 1





When the dynamic (9) of the system is not known but can be easily simulated,
reinforcement-learning algorithms can be used [7, 43]. A reinforcement-learning al-
gorithm learns the value function while using its current optimal strategy. As the
algorithm accumulates information, it computes better strategies. Reinforcement-
learning algorithms work by balancing exploration and exploitation. Exploration
refers to using new strategies in order to get a better estimate of the value function.
Exploitation refers to using a strategy maximizing the current estimate of the value
function. Dynamic programming is an offline approach, whereas reinforcement learning
is an online approach.
Most dynamic-programming algorithms compute the value function U∗ : X →
R. Some reinforcement-learning algorithms compute instead the action value func-
tion Q : X ×A → R defined by





) ∣∣x, a]. (16)
For example, SARSA and Q-learning are reinforcement-learning versions of policy
iteration and value iteration respectively.
3.2 Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
POMDPs model situations where the agent is uncertain about the state of the
dynamical system. In a POMDP, the state evolves according to (9). However, at each
time step, the agent cannot observe the state and can only observe a signal y drawn
according to
y ∼ g(x), (17)
where y is a signal in finite state space Y and g : X → ∆(Y) is an observation function.
In this setup, the information available to the agent is called private history and is
denoted by p. At time t, the agent has observed pt = (y0, a0, y1, a1, . . . , yt−1, at−1, yt).
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The information available to the agent is pictured in Figure 9. This small change in



















Figure 9: Agent information in a POMDP. The agent knows all of the causality relations,
the transition function f , the observation function g and at time step t it has observed private
history pt. In particular, the state is never observed and therefore is not part of the private
history.
In an MDP, the state is the only necessary information needed to compute the
next action of an optimal strategy. In a POMDP, the agent does not know the state
and needs to use beliefs to implement an optimal strategy. Beliefs are probability
distributions over states computed using the signals observed and Bayes’ inference.
An optimal solution for a POMDP is a function from the belief space
⋃∞
t=0 ∆(X t) to
the action set. The fact that the belief space is continuous is what makes the problem




















Figure 10: Minimal agent information in a POMDP. Bellman’s principle of optimality
guarantees it is enough to know the distribution β over the states to act optimally. However,
the belief space B = ∆(X ) is uncountable, hence, the problem is intractable. Bayesian
inference is denoted by b.
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3.3 Repeated Games
MDPs are the simplest dynamic decision-making problems. Similarly, repeated games
are the simplest dynamic games. In a repeated game, agents play a one-shot game at
discrete time steps and accumulate their payoffs with a discount factor. This section
introduces repeated games with an emphasis on their similarities with MDPs.
Consider a set of agents I and a one-shot game described by utility functions u =
(ui)i∈I where ui : A → R. At each time step t, agent i chooses an action ai ∈ Ai.
Over time, the agents accumulate some information. In the simplest class of repeated
games, called perfect-monitoring repeated games, each agent observes the joint action
played at each time step. The sequence of joint actions is called the public history, or
simply history when there is no risk of confusion. The history up to time t is ht =
(a0, a1, . . . , at−1). Denote by Ht the set of histories up to time t and by H = ∪t∈NHt
the set of all possible histories. The information observable over an infinite run is
called an infinite history. The set of infinite histories is denoted by H∞.
The joint action a yields a payoff ui(a) for agent i. Agent i is interested in
maximizing its expected sum of discounted payoffs for a given discount factor δi ∈ [0, 1).










The same way a one-shot game is described by a tuple of utility functions u, a
perfect-monitoring repeated game is described by a pair (u, δ), where δ = (δi)i∈I .
Agent i’s choice of action ai at time t only depends on the observed sequence of
joint actions ht up to time t. Therefore a strategy for agent i is an element σi such
that σi : H → ∆(Ai). The set of strategies for agent i are denoted by Σi and the joint
strategy set by Σ =
∏












For the sake of rigor, when introducing MDPs, two symbols were used for the payoffs
associated with a history, V (h), and with a strategy, U(σ). When unambiguous, Ui
represents either payoff.
Repeated games include a time component which is not present in one-shot games.
However, a repeated game can be viewed as a one shot game with action set Σ and
utilities U = (Ui)i∈I . Therefore the notions of best response and Nash equilibria
in one-shot games directly translate to repeated games. For an agent i and fixed
strategies of its opponents σ−i, agent i faces an MDP with state h. Its best response
strategy is therefore characterized by Bellman’s equation. A Nash equilibrium for a
repeated game is therefore a tuple of strategies each satisfying a Bellman equation
induced by the other ones. Note that the state space H is in this case is countable
and not finite.
The knowledge of a pair of agents in a repeated game with perfect-monitoring is
presented in Figure 11. Notice the strong resemblance with Figure 7 when looking

















Figure 11: Agent knowledge in a two-player perfect-monitoring repeated game. The public
history is the sequence of joint actions. It is shared as it is observed by both agents.
This section emphasized the similarities between repeated games and MDPs.
However, there is one major difference in the treatment of repeated games. This
difference is the subject of the following subsection.
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3.3.1 Sequential Rationality
In a two-player repeated game, a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies (σ1, σ2).
Agent 1’s strategy σ1 is an optimal strategy for the MDP induced by σ2. However,
the conditions for a Nash equilibrium do not address the case where agent 2 does not
follow σ2. The following example illustrates this difficulty introduced by the notion of
time.











It describes a game in its so-called extensive form. Play starts with the state being
the root of the tree. When the state is a non-terminal node, the number in the circle
determines which agent is to take an action. The branches of this node correspond to
the actions available to this agent. The action taken determines the next state. When
the state is a leaf, the game is over. The numbers in this leaf correspond to the payoffs
for both agents. Therefore, the game described by (18) has the following interpretation:
• Agent 1 chooses between actions L and R.
– If L is chosen, the game is over; agent 1 receives a payoff of 1 and agent 2
a payoff of 0.
– If R is chosen, it is now agent 2’s turn to choose between actions l and r.
Irrespective of which action is chosen, the game ends after it.
∗ If l is chosen, both agents receive a payoff of 2.
∗ If r is chosen, agent 1 receives a payoff of 0 and agent 2 a payoff of 1.
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Note 7 (Extensive-form Games). Extensive-form games can always be redefined in
a one-shot form. For example, the extensive-form game (18) admits the following
one-shot definition:
l r
L 1, 0 1, 0
R 2, 2 0, 1 .
(19)
Note that agent 2’s action does not impact the payoffs when agent 1 plays L. Therefore,
the agents’ incentives are preserved and rational agents exhibit identical behaviors in
the one-shot game or the extensive-form game. Since the incentives are preserved,
Nash equilibria are also preserved.
Example 4 (Non-credible Threat [continued]). Extensive-form games are not repeated
games. However, they introduce a notion of time that is sufficient to illustrate the
problem at hand.
Note 7 shows us that this game has two pure Nash equilibria: (R, l) and (L, r).
Let’s focus on (L, r). Under the joint action (L, r), agent 1 plays and the game ends
immediately. Therefore, agent 2’s action does not affect the payoffs and agent 2 has
no incentive to unilaterally deviate. If agent 1 switches its action to R its payoff goes
from 1 to 0 so it has no incentive to unilaterally deviate either. However, this switch
to R brings an interesting situation to the table. If the deviation occurs, it becomes
agent 2’s turn to play. Agent 2 has committed to playing r. However, if the game
ever reaches that stage, a rational agent would always play l. The problem is that
agent 2 makes a non-credible threat. Agent 2 is threatening agent 1 with a low payoff.
However, enforcing that threat requires agent 2 to act irrationally by taking a smaller
payoff, 1 instead of 2. This equilibrium is said to lack sequential rationality.
In the normal-form representation the problem is not as apparent since both agents
play at the same time. However, since anything is a best response to L, agent 2
could move to l which would prompt agent 1 to move to R leading to the other Nash
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equilibrium and both agents’ payoff increases. Therefore, even in the normal-form
representation, the weakness of (L, r) is observable.
When time is involved, strategies have the potential to exclude some states. In this
example, agent 2 never gets to play. A Nash equilibrium does not impose anything
on these states. A sequentially-rational equilibrium, however, imposes no profitable
unilateral deviation even on these unreachable states. This condition is equivalent to
forbidding non-credible threats.
Backwards induction is used to verify if a Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form
game is sequentially rational. In this example, start at agent 2’s turn. The only
rational action is l. Propagate this information backwards and analyze agent 1’s
turn. At this point, agent 1 has to play R. This proves the only sequentially-rational
equilibrium of this game is (R, l).
In a repeated game, agents do not alternate playing turns. However, the action of
an agent eliminates some possible histories, creating some unreachable states. The
Nash equilibrium condition in repeated games only verifies Bellman’s equation on the
reachable states. Sequential rationality in repeated games verifies Bellman’s equation
on all the possible states. In an MDP, unreachable states are simply ignored as the
model guarantees that these states will never be seen.
Let’s now give the formal definition of sequential rationality for perfect-monitoring
repeated games. In this context, a sequentially-rational equilibrium is called a subgame-
perfect equilibrium.
Definition 9 (Subgame-perfect Equilibrium). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot
game and δ = (δi)i∈I be discount factors. Let σi ∈ Σi be a strategy for agent i.
The joint strategy σ = (σi)i∈I is a subgame-perfect equilibrium if for every agent i ∈
I and every history h ∈ H, the strategy σi is optimal with respect to the MDP induced
by σ−i with initial state h.
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The game-theoretic literature often mentions the one-shot deviation principle as a
key result in verifying subgame perfection. It only restates that Bellman’s equation
has to be verified at every state h, including unreachable ones.
3.3.2 Folk Theorem
Sequentially-rational equilibria are the logical extension of Nash equilibria for repeated
games. As mentioned previously, in the static-game setting, economists are interested
in characterizing the set of achievable payoffs at equilibrium. A similar characterization
is studied for repeated games. The results are more difficult to obtain but a folk
theorem has guided this line of research. The name folk theorem comes from the
community believing it to be true before a proof existed. To state the folk theorem,
the concepts of feasibility and individual rationality of payoffs are described below.
Definition 10 (Feasible Payoff). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot game. A joint
payoff p ∈ R|I| is feasible for u if there exist convex coefficients (θa)a∈A indexed by the
joint actions, such that p =
∑
a∈A θau(a). The tuple (θa)a∈A forms convex coefficients
if θa ∈ [0, 1] for all a ∈ A and
∑
a∈A θa = 1. Simply put, a payoff is feasible if it is a
convex combination of pure payoffs.
Definition 11 (Minmax Value). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot game and i ∈ I
be an agent. Suppose the opponents of agent i have fixed their, potentially mixed,








Definition 12 (Individually-rational Payoff). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot
game. A joint payoff p ∈ R|I| is individually rational for u if for all agents i ∈ I, pi is
greater or equal than the minmax value of agent i. A joint payoff p ∈ R|I| is strictly
individually rational for u if for all agents i ∈ I, pi is strictly greater than the minmax
value of agent i.
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The folk theorem states that every feasible individually-rational payoff of the
one-shot game is achievable as the expected sum of discounted payoffs of a sequentially-
rational equilibrium for a discount factor close enough to one.
The following example illustrates the concepts of feasible and individually-rational
payoffs.
Example 5 (Feasible Individually-rational Payoffs in the Battle of the Sexes). Recall




F 2, 2 0, 1
O 0, 0 1, 3 .







































































































Figure 12: Feasible enforceable payoffs in the battle of the sexes. The dotted circles
corresponds to the payoffs of the four pairs of pure actions. The union of the light gray and
the dark gray areas represents the feasible payoffs. The dashed lines represent the minmax
values. The dark gray area corresponds to the feasible and individually-rational payoffs.
The feasible payoffs are contained in the convex hull of the pure payoffs. The
individually-rational payoffs are those above both minmax values. The feasible and
individually-rational payoffs for the battle of the sexes are illustrated in Figure 12.
The folk theorem is not a single result. It takes different forms, each targeting a
specific scenario. The simplest result concerns perfect-monitoring repeated games.
Theorem 5 (Perfect-monitoring Folk Theorem). Let u : A → R|I| describe a one-shot
game. Let p ∈ R|I| be a feasible strictly-individually-rational payoff for u.
There exist strategies σ = (σi)i∈I and discount factors δ = (δi)i∈I close enough to 1
such that σ form a subgame-perfect equilibrium for the perfect-monitoring repeated
game (u, δ) yielding an expected sum of discounted payoff of p.
For a proof of this result, see in [31, Proposition 3.8.1]
Apart from perfect-monitoring repeated games, there are two other categories of
repeated games. Public imperfect-monitoring and private monitoring repeated games
are explored next. Their associated folk theorems are brushed upon.
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3.3.3 Public Imperfect Monitoring
Consider a set of agents I and a one-shot game described by utility functions u = (ui)i∈I
where ui : Ai → R. At each time step t, agent i chooses an action ai ∈ Ai. Over time,
the agents accumulate some information. The joint action induces a signal s, from
finite signal space S, distributed according to
s+ ∼ n(a),
where n : A → ∆(S). The sequence of signals is called the public history, or simply his-
tory when there is no risk of confusion. The history up to time t is ht = (s0, s1, . . . , st−1).
Denote by Ht the set of histories up to time t and by H = ∪t∈NHt the set of all
possible histories. The information observable over an infinite run is called an infinite
history. The set of infinite histories is denoted by H∞. Each agent also observes the
actions it has played. This sequence of actions is called the its private history. Agent i’
private history up to time t is pti = (ai
0, ai
1, . . . , ai
t−1).
The knowledge of the agents in a two-player public imperfect-monitoring repeated





































Figure 13: Agent knowledge in a two-player public-monitoring repeated game. The public
history is shared as it is observed by both agents.
Public-monitoring folk theorem results exist. Under some technical conditions
for the signal, all the feasible strictly-individually-rational payoff are achievable by
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sequentially-rational equilibria in public strategies. A strategy is public if it only
uses the public history to compute actions. The knowledge of the agents in a two-






















Figure 14: Agent knowledge in a two-player public-monitoring repeated game with public
strategies. The private histories are not kept and only the public history remains.
3.3.4 Private Monitoring
Consider a set of agents I and a one-shot game described by utility functions u = (ui)i∈I
where ui : Ai → R. At each time step t, agent i chooses an action ai ∈ Ai. The joint
action induces for agent i a signal si from finite signal space Si. The signals s = (si)i∈I
are potentially correlated and distributed according to
s+ ∼ n(a),
where n : A → ∆(S). The sequence of signals observed by agent i is called its private
history, or simply history when there is no risk of confusion. Agent i’s history up to
time t is hti = (si
0, si
1, . . . , si
t−1). Denote by Hti the set of agent i’s histories up to
time t and by Hi = ∪t∈NHti the set of all possible histories. The information observable
over an infinite run is called an infinite history. The set of infinite histories for agent i
is denoted by H∞i .
The knowledge of the agents in a two-player private-monitoring repeated game is










































Figure 15: Agent knowledge in a two-player private-monitoring repeated game.
Perfect-monitoring repeated games are closely related to MDPs. Therefore, the
sequential-rationality condition in a perfect-monitoring repeated game requires the
Bellman equation to be satisfied after every possible history. Similarly, private-
monitoring repeated games are related to POMDPs. Agent i faces a POMDP with
state (hi)i∈I and observation (ai, si). Accordingly, in the private-monitoring setting,
the sequential-rationality condition requires that each agent’s strategy be optimal for
a POMDP. This requires that the Bellman equation involving beliefs over the state
be satisfied after every possible tuple of histories (hi)i∈I . The fact that the agent do
not share a public signal makes this setting incredibly more complicated.
The folk theorem for private-monitoring repeated games has recently been de-
rived [42]. Before this 200-page long achievement, some partial results relied on the
existence of subsets of strategies with a nice recursive structure. For example, belief-
free equilibria [11,12] and weakly belief-free equilibria [25] are two solution concepts
that were used to derive some partial folk theorems. In a belief-free equilibrium, agents
must only use actions that are optimal no matter what their belief about the last
action played by their opponents is. In a weakly belief-free equilibrium, agents only
need to have correct beliefs about the last action played by their opponents.
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3.4 Stochastic Games
Stochastic games [38] are the most general extension of MDPs to the multiagent setting.
The utility functions of the agents depend on a state whose dynamic is impacted by
the joint actions. In other terms, for each state, the agents play a different game.
Their actions impact the payoffs and the transition probabilities between states. In a
stochastic game, the agents want to maximize the expected sum of their discounted
payoffs.
In a stochastic game, a state evolves in discrete time controlled by the joint action
of a set of agents I. The state at time t+ 1 is a random variable depending only on
the state of the system at time t and the joint action played at time t. This dynamic
is captured by the short notation
x+ ∼ f(x, a), (20)
where x and x+ are states in a finite state space X and a =
(
a1, . . . , a|I|
)
is a joint
action in the finite joint action set A =
∏
i∈I Ai. In state x, the joint action a yields
for agent i a payoff ui(x, a).
A variety of stochastic games are defined by varying the monitoring structure. As
an example, the agent-knowledge diagrams for perfect and private monitoring are























Figure 16: Agent knowledge in a two-player perfect-monitoring stochastic game
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The main results in repeated games characterize the payoffs achievable at equilib-
rium. There are virtually no result to actually compute equilibrium strategies. This
lack of result is not surprising. In the simplest setting of perfect-monitoring repeated
game, at equilibrium an agent need to solve an MDP. This MDP depends on the
strategies of its opponents. However, the strategies of the opponents is usually not
available to the agent, especially in a learning setting where the strategies evolve.
Stochastic games form a strict superset of repeated games. The added complexity

















































































































DECENTRALIZED CONTROL AND GAMES
4.1 Decentralized Control through Learning in Stochastic
Games
A complex system is a set of agents connected through a network. The subsystems
of a car, a robotic plant, and the power grid are examples of complex systems at
different scales. The advances in information technology made these complex systems
ubiquitous, and tools to control them are needed. These systems can be controlled
in a centralized fashion. However, a centralized controller represents a single point
of failure, does not scale to large networks, and incurs high communication costs.
Adaptive decentralized controllers address these problems. A controller is decentralized
if each agent in the system makes some decisions. Decentralization renders the system
more robust by not having a single point of failure. A controller is adaptive in the
sense of [18, 19] if each agent is doing simple computations using local information.
Adaptivity mitigates the scalability and communication issues.
In optimal control, centralized controllers are the optima of a function. Unfortu-
nately, in the multiagent setting, the notion of optimality is ill defined. Game theory,
the study of interacting decision makers, addresses this issue by replacing optima
with equilibria. An equilibrium is a joint decision satisfying all the agents at once; at
equilibrium, no agent has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. In a game-theoretic
approach, decentralized controllers are equilibria of a game.
Equilibria can be computed by a centralized algorithm. However, this centralized
approach brings back the issue of scalability and prevents the addition of new agents
without designing a new controller. Game-theoretic learning enables the decentralized
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computation of equilibria. Each agent modifies its strategy according to a learning rule
using local information. The learning rules used by the agents are chosen to guarantee
convergence to an equilibrium. Game-theoretic learning is an adaptive decentralized
approach to designing adaptive decentralized controllers.
Engineering problems often involve dynamical systems with a state, such as MDPs.
When the decision maker cannot observe the state directly it is facing a POMDP.
Solving an MDP is tractable for reasonable sizes of the state space, whereas solving a
POMDP is intractable. Stochastic games extend these processes to the multiagent
case. In a complex system, agents only observe local information. Therefore, the
games used to control these systems are stochastic games of imperfect information.
These games are, like POMDPs, intractable. To this day, there exists no centralized
algorithm nor learning rule for computing equilibria in stochastic games.
The full-rationality requirement of game theory is in part to blame for this lack
of results. Full rationality requires agents to have perfect understanding of the game
being played. This requirement is not realistic for engineered agents which have, by
nature, bounded rationality. This research uses bounded rationality to make each
agent face an MDP instead of a POMDP.
The rest of this chapter introduces work paving the way towards using game-
theoretic learning to design decentralized controllers. These results are grouped under
three main themes: learning in games, equilibria in repeated games, and bounded
rationality.
4.2 Learning in Games
As previously mentioned, Nash equilibria are self-enforcing agreements. Learning
studies the question of how agents reach such an agreement. Learning in the economics
literature tries to explain behaviors observed in experiments; the authors look for
simple rules human decision makers likely use. The ensuing debate concerning the
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validity of learning algorithms for human decision makers is irrelevant for this research.
In the learning framework, a game is played repeatedly at discrete time steps.
Agents use strategies to choose their actions. At a given time step, an agent plays
an action and receives a signal. This signal is most of the time the joint action. The
agent then updates its strategy depending on the received signal. The update rule is
called a learning algorithm. The goal is to define learning algorithms making the joint
action converge to a Nash equilibrium [17].
A learning algorithm is composed of the three following components:
• Information accumulation
• Optimization of a function constructed from that information
• Randomization to avoid being trapped in local optima
Randomization commonly takes the form of smoothing; instead of playing a best
response, an agent plays a mixed action favoring the best response and putting a
small probability on other actions. A learning algorithm is called adaptive if the
information is accumulated locally and the optimization is an easy computational task.
In economics, the easiness of a computational task is defined with human decision
makers in mind. In this research, the easiness is defined for an engineered decision
maker; for example, computing the eigenvectors of a medium size matrix is considered
an easy computational task. Adaptivity is an important characteristic of learning
algorithms for scaling.
Fictitious play is an example of an adaptive learning algorithm. In fictitious play,
agents keep track of the empirical frequencies of the actions played by their opponents.
At each time step, an agent plays a best response to the mixed action induced by
these empirical frequencies of play. Information is accumulated through the empirical
frequencies. Optimization takes the form of playing a best response. Smooth fictitious
play is a variant incorporating the randomization component.
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Unfortunately, fictitious play does not always converge to a Nash equilibrium [39].
In fact, no adaptive learning rule converges to Nash equilibria for all games [21].
This result is in part due to the fact that computing a Nash equilibrium is PPAD
complete [9]. PPAD, which stands for Polynomial Parity Arguments on Directed
graphs, is a complexity class contained between P and NP. PPAD complete problems
are believed to be hard to solve but the exact relationship to P and NP is not known.
Three approaches to designing simple convergent algorithms are presented below.
One considers correlated equilibria with a weaker notion of convergence, another
focuses on the class of weakly-acyclic games, and the last one uses the less constraining
solution concept of stochastically stable states.
4.2.1 Correlated Equilibria
Hart and Mas-Colell proved that a family of adaptive learning rules converge to the
set of correlated equilibria [18–20]. These algorithms rely on the notion of regret. A
regret measures the payoff difference between two actions. Formally, the regret for
playing a instead of a′ is the average increase in payoff the agent would have received,
had it replaced every play of a by a′. The optimization step seeks to minimize the
regrets. As a result, the family of algorithms is called no regret. The guaranteed
convergence of these algorithms comes not only from the simpler equilibrium concept
but also from the use of a looser notion of convergence on a different quantity. Indeed,
no-regret algorithms guarantee the convergence of the empirical distribution of play to





is different from the joint action at and that convergence to a set is less constraining
than convergence to a point.
4.2.2 Weakly Acyclic Games
A game is weakly acyclic if from any joint action there exists a better-reply path ending
at some pure Nash equilibrium. This structure on the utility functions, introduced by
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Young [47], insures that better-reply learning algorithms converge to a Nash equilibrium
in weakly acyclic games [48]. Weakly acyclic games are an extension of potential
games, a class of games used to model congestion problems and to systematically
design decentralized controllers [29].
4.2.3 Stochastically Stable States
Young introduced the notion of stochastically stable states to characterize the long-run
behavior of a Markov chain subject to a diminishing random noise [46]. A state is
stochastically stable if it is visited infinitely often as the noise fades. Learning in this
context is different from learning an equilibrium. Agents should, as a whole, make the
noise fade in a way guaranteeing that the stochastically stable states of the system
are the desirable ones. This notion of stability was used to control wind farms [32],
to characterize the yield of self-assembly mechanisms [15], and to study language
evolution [14].
4.3 Equilibria in Repeated Games
This section presents results pertaining to repeated games. The first result extends
the parallel existing between MDPs and repeated games by adapting reinforcement
learning to a multiagent setting. The next three results are equilibrium concepts
lowering the requirements on the beliefs imposed by sequential rationality.
4.3.1 Multiagent Reinforcement Learning
Hu and Wellman attempted to apply results from reinforcement learning to the
multiagent setting with the Nash–Q-learning algorithm [22]. In stochastic games, it
is unfortunately not enough to balance exploration and exploitation. The Nash–Q-
learning algorithm requires the agents to keep track of action-value functions for their
opponents and to play Nash-equilibrium strategies. This approach is computationally
expensive and only yields results for agents with identical or opposite utility functions.
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When agents have identical utility functions, the problem is identical to a single-
agent problem. Therefore, classical reinforcement-learning results carry over. When
agents have opposite utility functions, they are facing a zero-sum game. In a zero-sum
game, one can define the solution by using the minimax theorem. The lack of ambiguity
in defining rational solution concepts explains the convergence.
4.3.2 Subjective and Self-confirming Equilibria
Subjective equilibria, introduced by Kalai and Lehrer, lower the requirements on the
beliefs in repeated games [24]. They only require the beliefs to be correct on the path
of play. Self-confirming equilibria, introduced by Fudenberg and Levine, are a closely
related concept [16]. In a self-confirming equilibrium an agent can hold the false
belief that its opponents correlate their actions off the path of play. Agents playing a
subjective or self-confirming equilibrium never see plays contradicting their beliefs.
Subjective and self-confirming equilibria are formally defined in terms of belief
strategies. Belief strategy σ̃ij : Hj → ∆(Aj) is the strategy agent i believes agent j
is playing. Agent i’s belief is composed of one belief strategy for each agent σ̃i =(




. In particular, its belief strategy for itself is its actual strategy σ̃ii = σi.
A set of |I| strategies, one per agent, induces a distribution over the possible
histories. The histories having a positive probability of being visited are called the
path of play. This set of strategies can be the actual strategies or the beliefs of one
agent. Note that a distribution over beliefs also induces a distribution over the possible
histories.
Strategies σ and beliefs σ̃ form a subjective equilibrium when the following two
conditions hold for each agent i:
• Strategy σi is a best response to the belief strategies σ̃i−i.
• Strategies σ and strategies σ̃i induce the same distribution over the path of play.
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Strategies σ and distributions over beliefs ν̃ form a self-confirming equilibrium
when the following two conditions hold for each agent i:
• Strategy σi is a best response to the distribution over belief strategies ν̃i−i.
• Strategies σ and the distribution over belief ν̃i induce the same distribution over
the path of play.
These two equilibrium concepts loosens the requirements of full rationality. Agents
can be mistaken about events that will never happen. However, these concepts require
each agent to be aware of the existence of every other agent. An agent needs to
understand what its opponents actions and signals are to build belief strategies. It
also needs to know the exact impact of its opponents actions to verify the optimality
of its own strategy. Therefore, these two equilibrium concepts are only a first step
towards the goal of this research.
4.3.3 Belief-free and Weakly Belief-free Equilibria
Belief-free equilibria and weakly belief-free equilibria are solution concepts for private-
monitoring repeated games, presented in Section 3.3.4. They lower the rationality
requirements by not requiring the agents to carry full beliefs about the state of their
opponents.
4.3.4 Analogy-based Expectation Equilibria
Jehiel introduced the concept of analogy-based expectation equilibria (ABEEs) for
games of perfect information to keep the belief space size constant [23]. ABEEs can
be expressed in terms of belief strategies. Each agent partitions the history set in a
finite number of analogy classes. An analogy class for agent i is denoted by κi and
the set of analogy classes by Ki. Each agent i believes that its opponents’ actions are
fully determined by the analogy class; for two histories h and h′ in the same analogy
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′) = αi,κij . The, potentially mixed, action α
i,κi
j
is called an analogy-based belief.
Strategies σ, analogy classes K, and analogy-based beliefs α form an ABEE when
the following two conditions hold for each agent i:
• Strategy σi is a sequentially rational best response to the analogy-based be-
liefs αi−i.
• For all agent j, the analogy-based belief αij is consistent with σj, i.e., for all κi
in Ki and aj in Aj, αi,κij [aj] = P[σj(h) = aj |h ∈ κi].
The ABEE concept is a substantial step in the direction of this research. The perfect
understanding required by full rationality is replaced by the notion of consistency.
Beliefs are consistent if they are accurate on average even though they might be
inexact upon closer inspection. This relaxation simplifies the problem that each agent
is facing. However, each agent is still required to have a good understanding about
the game being played and the role of its opponents. This research goes beyond this
limitation by using consistency in a setup where agents do not need to know they are
playing a game. The following section exposes other approaches using consistency.
4.4 Bounded Rationality and Consistency
In classical game theory, agents are assumed to be fully rational. Bounded rationality
studies scenarios where agents have limited computation power or make mistakes [36].
In the economics literature, bounded rationality is used to take into account human
nature and to explain discrepancies with experiments. Fully rational agents can
perfectly use any knowledge they have about the problem they face. For example,
in a stochastic game of imperfect information, fully rational agents propagate beliefs
accurately. Propagating beliefs means doing Bayesian inference on a belief space
whose size increases with time. Engineered agents have limited computation power,
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limited memory, and bounded precision. Furthermore, adaptivity requires the use of
local and therefore incomplete information. As a result, there is no hope to build fully
rational adaptive agents in a dynamic world. In this research, the bounded rationality
of engineered agents is used as an advantage. Instead of relying on propagation of
beliefs regarding the imperfect information, simple consistent models are used. A
model is consistent if the agent does not observe evidence contradicting it.
Four approaches using bounded rationality to lower the complexity of the problem
are presented below. The first one uses Kalman filtering to update a model while the
others use the notion of consistency. All the consistency approaches use exogenous
models, whereas this research lifts that restriction. Other differences with this research
are highlighted.
4.4.1 Linear Modeling
Chang, Ho and Kaelbling used modeling to simplify multiagent learning [8]. Each
agent assumes that the signal received is generated from a linear system and uses
Kalman filtering to get the best estimate of the current state.
4.4.2 Mean-field Games
Lasry and Lions studied a setting where a very large number of agents faces identical
copies of an MDP [28]. The MDPs are coupled through a common signal received
by the agents. This signal is the proportion of agents in each state; it is a stochastic
process impacted by the strategies of all the agents. Agents compute their optimal
strategies by considering a consistent, exogenous and stationary model of the signal.
Agents are in a mean-field equilibrium (MFE) if their optimal strategies induce
precisely this stationary signal. The goal of MFEs is to simplify the analysis of games
with a very large number of agents. The main result in the MFE literature is that
when the number of agents goes to infinity, MFEs coincide with Nash equilibria. The
fact that the signal is not truly stationary nor exogenous washes away when the
72
number of agents is large. MFEs aim at simplifying the analysis of Nash equilibria
for a specific game with a large number of players. This research aims for a different
equilibrium concept in general games with any number of players. Furthermore, MFEs
focuses on stationary models, whereas this research considers more elaborate models.
Weintraub, Benkard, and van Roy applied the mean-field methodology to approximate
subgame-perfect equilibria in a problem of dynamic imperfect competition [45]. They
named their equilibrium concept oblivious equilibrium.
4.4.3 Incomplete Theories
Eyster and Piccione analyzed a scenario in which traders have exogenous nonstationary
consistent models of prices on the stock market; these models are called incomplete
theories [13]. The traders use their theories to acquire assets. The key result is that
traders with more complete theories do not necessarily perform better. The main
difference with this research is that, the actions of the traders do not influence prices.
Therefore, prices are truly exogenous; traders do not need to update their models.
4.4.4 Egocentric Modeling
Seah and Shamma analyzed a specific game where two agents share a one-dimensional
signal [37]. The signal is stochastic and influenced by the strategies of the agents.
However, the agents model it with a consistent stationary exogenous model. Similarly,





Chapter 3 showed that equilibria in repeated games and stochastic games are compli-
cated entities. At best, at equilibrium in a perfect-monitoring repeated game, each
agent solves an MDP. At worst, in a private-monitoring stochastic game, each solves
a POMDP. This chapter introduces a new equilibrium concept for stochastic games
in which each agent only solves an MDP. As was the case in Chapters 2 and 3, the
concept is first introduced through a single-agent point of view. Then, the full-fledged
multiagent case is exposed.
The following presentation of this research was first developed in [10].
5.1 Single-agent Setup






where x is a state, a is an action, and s is a signal. Variables x, a, and s take values in
finite sets X , A, and S, respectively. The agent picks the action a. Nature determines
the signal s+ according to






where w is a state of Nature evolving in the finite state spaceW . The agent observes s
but not w. Denote by N the dynamical system described by (21) and (22). Think
of this system as a perturbed MDP. The block diagram associated with (21) will be
used later in this chapter. It is represented in Figure 18.
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Figure 18: Block diagram for the MDP with perturbation signal. The contour of the block
in the condensed representation is doubled. This serves as a visual reminder that the output
variable is fed back into the block.
Define the agent’s observation by o = (x, a, s+) and the actual realization of
the system by r = (w, x, a, s+). At time t, the agent’s private history is pt =
(o0, o1, . . . , ot) ∈ P t and the true history is ht = (r0, r1, . . . , rt). Denote by P = ∪t∈NP t
the set of finite private histories. A strategy σ : P → ∆(A) is a mapping from private
histories to a distribution over the actions. The agent knowledge of this perturbed
MDP is represented in Figure 19, using the diagram format introduced in Chapter 3.
At each time step, the agent receives a payoff according to the utility function u :




tu(xt, at, st+1), where δ ∈ [0, 1) is a discount factor. The








) ∣∣∣∣∣x0 = x
]
.
When the agent knows (21) and (22), it is facing a POMDP. To see why, com-
pare Figure 19 with Figure 9. The POMDP has state (w, x) and observed value (x, s).
A natural solution concept for this type of problems is an optimal policy for the
POMDP. As described in Section 3.2, the agent computes an optimal policy using
beliefs, which are probability distributions over states. Beliefs are obtained from the
private histories pt, the signaling structure (22), and the application of Bayes’ rule.
Belief computation is intractable because the size of the belief space grows with time.
The present research is interested in the case where the agent knows (21) but does


































































































agent fully understands the effect of the perturbation s on (21) but does not know
how this perturbation is generated. This block diagram for this setting is shown in
Figure 20. The information known to the agent is highlighted in Figure 21. In such a
setting, a less constraining solution concept is required. Empirical-evidence optimality
is one such solution concept that relies on the notion of statistical consistency.







Figure 20: Block diagram for the single-agent empirical-evidence setup N. The agent is
aware of facing an MDP with an unknown perturbation signal. The noisy contour of Nature
emphasizes that the agent does not know anything about it. Furthermore, Nature has access
to all the variables to compute s, but these dependencies are not represented.
5.2 Depth-k Consistency
The notion of consistency used in this research is best introduced through an example.
Example 6 (Binary Signal). Suppose an agent receives a binary signal. Furthermore,
suppose the agent has no information about the underlying generating process. When
the agent observes a realization of this binary signal, it can compute certain parameters.
One of the simplest set of parameters is the probabilities of 0s and 1s. For example,
if the agent observes the following sequence:
Sa = 011011011011011011 . . . ,
































































































































































































































Similarly, if the agent observes this other sequence:









If the probabilities of 0s and 1s are the only parameters used by the agent, it would
not differentiate Sa and Sb. Sequences Sa and Sb are said to be depth-0 consistent.
The agent can use more parameters to characterize the signal. For example, the
































for Sb. Using these parameters, which correspond to a deeper analysis, the agent is
able to differentiate Sa and Sb. Sequences Sa and Sb are not depth-1 consistent.
Consider C, an S-valued process. For k in N, its depth-k characteristic χk is the










Two processes with the same depth-k characteristic are called depth-k consistent.
The signal observed by the agent is one such S-valued process. Consider another S-






s+ ∼ µ(z), (24b)
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where z is a state in Sk and mk is the length-k–memory function defined by
mk
((






st−k+2, . . . , st, st+1
)
,
and whose block diagram is depicted in Figure 22. Under some technical assumptions,
described in Section 5.3, the observed signal and the Markov chain described by (24)
are ergodic processes. Furthermore, the Markov chain is depth-k consistent with the










∣∣ (st−k+1, . . . , st−1, st) = z].








Figure 22: Block diagram for the depth-k mockup.
Example 7 (Binary Signal [continued]). The agent has observed a realization of the
signal. It has computed the parameters of interest. The agent now creates a mockup
with similar parameters. It fixes, a priori, a deterministic Markov chain, as described
by (24a). Then, it identifies the values of µ making the mockup consistent with the
observed sequence.
For depth-0 consistency, it is sufficient to use a Markov chain with a single state,
as depicted in Figure 23. Remember that sequences Sa and Sb are depth-0 consistent.
Therefore, a single distribution µ(z∅) makes the mockup depth-0 consistent with Sb
and Sb. This distribution is the following:












s = 0 s = 1
Figure 23: Mockup enabling depth-0 consistency with binary signals. The mockup is
composed of a fixed deterministic Markov chain m0 with a single state and a distribution µ(z∅).
By adjusting the distribution µ(z∅), this mockup can be made depth-0 consistent with any
given ergodic binary signal.
For depth-1 consistency, a Markov chain with two state, portrayed in Figure 24, is
required. The distributions making the mockup depth-1 consistent with the sequence Sa
are
µ(z0)[0] = Pa[0 | z0] = 0,
µ(z0)[1] = Pa[1 | z0] = 1,
and








Similarly,the distributions making the mockup depth-1 consistent with the sequence Sb
are



















µ(z0) = ? µ(z1) = ?
s = 1
s = 0
s = 0 s = 1
Figure 24: Mockup enabling depth-1 consistency with binary signals. The mockup is
composed of a fixed deterministic Markov chain m1 with two states and two distributions µ(z0)
and µ(z1). By adjusting the distributions µ(z0) and µ(z1), this mockup can be made depth-1
consistent with any given ergodic binary signal.
Note that the mockup is split in two parts. First, since the agent does not know
anything about the signal, it assumes that it is generated by a parametric model.
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Second, it computes observation distributions matching the empirical evidence provided
by the signal. The mockup built this way is consistent with the signal. Nothing in the
empirical evidence contradicts the assumption made by the agent.
Denote by Mk the dynamical system described by (21) and (24). This system is
obtained from the original system N by substituting Nature with a depth-k consistent
mockup. It is depicted in Figure 25. The system Mk induces an MDP with state (x, z),














A strategy σ for the MDP can be implemented in the real system by building z
with (24a). This trick, allowing to use a strategy designed for the simpler system Mk
in the more complicated system N, is illustrated in Figure 26. The agent knowledge
in system Mk is depicted in Figure 27. The simplification to the agent knowledge


















(b) Closed loop with a strategy
Figure 25: Block diagram for the single-agent empirical-evidence setup with mockup Mk.
For a given distribution µ, the system forms a finite MDP and an optimal strategy can be
computed.
By using depth-k consistency, we went from an arbitrarily complicated system N
















(b) Closed loop with a strategy
Figure 26: Block diagram for the single-agent empirical-evidence setup N with length-
k–memory function. For a given strategy, the closed-loop system generates a probability





















Figure 27: Agent knowledge in the single-agent empirical-evidence setup with mockup Mk.















































































































































































































system and measure their impact in the real system.
Consider the following iterative process, illustrated in Figure 29. The agent
implements an initial strategy σ0. It formulates a depth-k consistent model µ0 of
Nature’s dynamic. Then, it computes an optimal strategy σ1 for the MDP induced
by this model µ0. Upon implementation of this new strategy, the model µ0 may lose
the requisite statistical consistency. Therefore, the agent formulates a revised depth-k
consistent model µ1 and the process repeats. A fixed point of this iterative process is
one way to define a solution to this problem. A strategy is a solution if it is optimal
with respect to the model it induces.
Using that model to design a strategy is equivalent to the agent making an
assumption about the system. For example, when the agent uses a depth-k consistent
model, it assumes the signal is generated exogenously, i.e., not impacted by x or a.
This assumption might seem restrictive. However, note that the repeated-modeling
and optimization phases create a feedback loop. Therefore, a model satisfying the
consistency condition is exogenous but captures characteristics of Nature’s dynamic.
The following section extends beyond the notion of depth-k consistency.
5.3 Empirical-evidence Optimality
The agent assumes that a Markov chain, with state z from a finite set Z, generates
the signal s and that it can construct z from its observations as follows:
z+ ∼ m
(
z, x+, a, s+
)
, (25a)
s+ ∼ µ(z). (25b)
The model m represents the assumption the agent makes about the system. The
predictor µ is the set of parameters the agent adjusts to obtain a signal resembling
its observations. The pair (m,µ) is called a mockup. Denote by M the dynamical
system described by (21) and (25). The block diagram for this system is depicted
in Figure 30. The block diagram for the associated system N with the model m is
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µ0(z)[s







(a) Use σ0 in N and measure µ0 that makes









(b) Use µ0 in M
k to setup an MDP. Com-
pute σ1 optimal for this MDP.
µ1(z)[s







(c) Use σ1 in N and measure µ1 that makes









(d) Use µ1 in M
k to setup an MDP. Com-
pute σ2 optimal for this MDP.
Figure 29: Iterative process alternating between the real and the mockup system. Using a
strategy in the real system yields a measurement. Using this measurement in the mockup
system yields an optimal strategy.
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depicted in Figure 31. The agent knowledge in systems M and N are presented in









Figure 30: Block diagram for the single-agent empirical-evidence setup with mockup M.








Figure 31: Block diagram for the single-agent empirical-evidence setup N with model m.
In this setup, depth-k consistency is replaced with the following definition.
Definition 13. Let σ be a strategy and (m,µ) be a mockup. Predictor µ is (σ,m)
consistent with N if









∣∣ zt = z].
The notion of optimality used is the following.
Definition 14. Let σ be a strategy, (m,µ) be a mockup, and ε be a positive number.
Strategy σ is (µ,m) optimal if it is optimal for the MDP induced by M. Strategy σ
is (ε, µ,m) optimal if it is ε optimal for the MDP induced by M.
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t t+ 1












zt zt+1 = m
(
zt, xt+1, at, st+1
)
Figure 32: Agent knowledge in the single-agent empirical-evidence setup with mockup M.
Having defined consistency and optimality the definition of an empirical-evidence
optimum (EEO) follows.
Definition 15. Let σ be a strategy, (m,µ) be a mockup, and ε be a positive number.
The pair (σ, µ) is an m EEO if the following two conditions hold:
1. Strategy σ is (µ,m) optimal.
2. Predictor µ is (σ,m) consistent with N.
The pair (σ, µ) is an (ε,m) EEO if the following two conditions hold:
1. Strategy σ is (ε, µ,m) optimal.
2. Predictor µ is (σ,m) consistent with N.
A little care must be taken to make µ in Definition 13 well defined. Insuring the
following assumption is verified guarantees it.
Assumption 1. Let σ be a strategy, and Tσ be the Markov chain with state X =
(w, x, z) induced by N and σ, X+ ∼ TσX. The Markov chain Tσ is irreducible and
aperiodic. In this case, some authors say that the Markov chain Tσ is ergodic.








































































































































Furthermore, Assumption 1 guarantees that πσ has full support, meaning that for
all w in W, x in X , and z in Z, πσ[w, x, z] is positive. This guarantees that µ











































a∈A πσ[w, x, z] · σ(x, z)[a] · n(w, x, a)[w+]∑
w∈W
∑
x∈X πσ[w, x, z]
(26)
One way to insure that Assumption 1 is verified is to have a small noise affect all
the transitions. Formally, this means that for all w ∈ W , x ∈ X , a ∈ A, and s+ ∈ S,
f(x, a, s+), n(w, x, a), ν(w), and σ(x, z) have full support. From now on, Assumption 1
is always verified.
5.4 Weak Consistency and Eventual Consistency
The notion of consistency exposed in Definition 13 is fairly strong. It requires that
the quantity PN,σ[st+1 = s+ | zt = z] converges for all z ∈ Z and s+ ∈ S. As a result,
the associated Assumption 1 is constraining. This section, highlights two slightly
less stringent notions of consistency with their associated assumptions. The first one,
weak consistency, uses a weaker notion of convergence. The second one, eventual
consistency, only requires convergence on a subset of states z ∈ Z.
First, let us define the notion of weak consistency. It relies on the fact that
convergence of the average of a sequence is weaker than convergence of the sequence.
Definition 16. Let σ be a strategy and (m,µ) be a mockup. Predictor µ is weakly
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(σ,m) consistent with N if













∣∣ zt = z].
The associated assumption is the following.
Assumption 2. Let σ be a strategy, and Tσ be the Markov chain with state X =
(w, x, z) induced by N and σ, X+ ∼ TσX. The Markov chain Tσ is irreducible.










∣∣ zt = z] = Pπσ[s+ ∣∣ z].
Furthermore, Assumption 2 guarantees that πσ has full support. Using the same
reasoning as in (26) guarantees that µ in Definition 16 is well defined.
Second, let us define the notion of eventual consistency. It relies on the fact that
the value of µ(z) for a state z with zero probability in the limit is irrelevant.
Definition 17. Let σ be a strategy and (m,µ) be a mockup. Predictor µ is eventually
(σ,m) consistent with N if for all z ∈ Z such that limt→∞ PN,σ[zt = z] > 0









∣∣ zt = z].
For z ∈ Z such that limt→∞ PN,σ[zt = z] = 0, there is no requirement on µ(z). Its
value is totally arbitrary.
If a state z is such that limt→∞ PN,σ[zt = z] = 0, it will not be seen in the long
run. Therefore, there is no need to impose some constraints on µ for this state. The
following assumption is associated with this definition.
Assumption 3. Let σ be a strategy, and Tσ be the Markov chain with state X =
(w, x, z) induced by N and σ, X+ ∼ TσX. The Markov chain Tσ is unichain and
aperiodic.
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A Markov chain is unichain if it contains a single communication class. Assump-
tion 3 insures that Tσ has a unique stationary distribution πσ with full support on
its communication class, and no support outside of it. Therefore, for z ∈ Z such







∣∣ zt = z] = Pπσ[s+ ∣∣ z].
Once again, using the same reasoning as in (26) guarantees that µ in Definition 17 is
well defined. The division by Pπσ [z] only occurs when this quantity is strictly positive.
When it is zero, µ is defined arbitrarily.
Combining Definitions 16 and 17 yields a third notion, eventual weak consistency.
The associated assumption requires the Markov chain to be unichain.
The following list summarizes the different notions of consistency and their associ-
ated assumptions on the Markov chain:
Consistent Irreducible and aperiodic.
Weakly consistent Irreducible.
Eventually consistent Unichain and aperiodic.
Eventually weakly consistent Unichain.
For conciseness reasons, the rest of this presentation only mentions the first notion
of consistency defined in Definition 13. However, the results are applicable to all
the notions of consistency defined in the present section. Extra care needed to
accommodate a specific notion of consistency will be addressed on a case by case basis.
5.5 Predictors and Strategies
Given a strategy σ, there is a unique predictor µ which is (σ,m) consistent with N.
This predictor can be measured in the system N, as depicted in Figure 31. Note
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that (26) guarantees that µ is a continuous function of σ and πσ. The mapping
associating a predictor to each strategy is a function. This function is denoted
by FM,m, where M stands for modeling.
Given a predictor µ, there might be multiple strategies σ that are (µ,m) optimal.
Such strategies are the optimal strategies for the MDP induced by system M, depicted
in Figure 30. Therefore, the mapping associating a predictor to the corresponding
optimal strategies is a correspondence. This correspondence is denoted FO,m, where O
stands for optimization. As in Chapter 2, we define a function approximating this
correspondence. This will allow us later to once again use Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem to gain intuition before using Kakutani’s. Consider the MDP induced by M.
Let U∗ : X ×Z → R be the value function for that MDP. Define Q : X ×Z ×A → R
by























The astute reader recognizes the Gibbs distribution, described in details in Note 5.
Recall that, as τ goes to 0, σ converges to a (µ,m)-optimal strategy. When τ is small
enough, σ is (ε, µ,m) optimal. To guarantee uniqueness, define τ to be the largest
value such that σ is (ε, µ,m) optimal. Note that σ defined that way is a continuous
function of the value function U∗. This function approximating the optimization
correspondence is denoted FO,m,ε.
The composition of an optimization mapping and a modeling mapping gives a
mapping from the space of strategies to itself. Two such mappings can be defined, the
correspondence Fm = FO,m ◦FM,m and the function Fm,ε = FO,m,ε ◦FM,m.




Consider a collection of agents I. Each agent i has a state xi, an action ai, and a
signal si. Let x be the tuple
(
x1, x2, . . . , x|I|
)
. Define a and s similarly. Agent i is
















All these systems are coupled through Nature which determines the signals s according
to






The rest of this section extends the notions of consistency and optimality to
this setting. The block diagrams and agent-knowledge figures for a two-agent setup,
available in Figures 34 to 37, help in following the discussion. In particular, they
highlight the fact that there are very few differences in the treatment of the single-agent
problem and the multiagent one. By design, the notions of consistency and optimality
used remove the differences between the two settings.
Denote by Ni the system from agent i’s perspective. In the single-agent setup, N
was composed of a known part (21) and an unknown part (22). Similarly, Ni has a
known part (27) and an unknown part (28) and (29).
The other definitions from previous sections can readily be extended to the
multiagent case. Agent i has a utility function ui, a discount factor δi, a strat-
egy σi : Pi → ∆(Ai), and a mockup of Nature and its opponents described by a





































































(b) Agent 2’s knowledge in M2
Figure 34: Agent knowledge in the two-agent empirical-evidence setup with mockup M1
and M2. Once again, the diagrams for the two agents are identical and not different from






















































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Agent 2’s block diagram
Figure 37: Block diagrams in the two-agent empirical-evidence setup with mockup M1
and M2. Notice that the two block diagrams are identical. Furthermore, from the agents’
perspective, there is no difference between the single-agent and the multiagent setting.
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From agent i’s perspective, everything is identical to the single-agent setup. The no-
tions of (µ,m) optimality, (ε, µ,m) optimality, and (σ,m) consistency can be replaced
by (µi,mi) optimality, (εi, µi,mi) optimality, and (σ,mi) consistency respectively.
Therefore, the definition of EEO readily extends to the multiagent setting.
Definition 18. Let σ, (m,µ), and ε such that for all i in I, σi is a strategy, (mi, µi)
is a mockup, and εi is a positive number. The pair (σ, µ) is an m EEE if the following
two conditions hold for all i in I:
1. Strategy σi is (µi,mi) optimal.
2. Predictor µi is (σ,mi) consistent with N.
The pair (σ, µ) is an (ε,m) EEE if the following two conditions hold for all i in I:
1. Strategy σi is (εi, µi,mi) optimal.
2. Predictor µ is (σ,mi) consistent with N.
For a given m and ε such that for all i in I, εi is a positive number, denote
by FO,m the optimization correspondence from predictors to strategies, by FO,m,ε
its approximating function, and by FM,m the modeling mapping from strategies to
predictors.
These mappings are defined by direct extension of their single agent counter-
parts. Define Fm, a correspondence from the space of strategies to itself, by Fm =
FO,m ◦FM,m. Similarly define Fm,ε, a function from the space of strategies to itself,
by Fm,ε = FO,m,ε ◦FM,m.
It is sometimes easier to work with a function from the space of predictors to itself.
In these cases, we use Gm,ε = FM,m ◦FO,m,ε.
Now that the setup has been established, it is time to prove some results. The
first result tackles the existence of EEEs.
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5.7 Existence of Empirical-evidence Equilibria
The proof of existence of empirical-evidence equilibria follows along the line of the
proof of existence of Nash equilibria presented in Section 2.5. It starts by proving
the existence of approximate equilibria through Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, before
proving the existence of exact equilibria using Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem. The
proof of the existence of Nash equilibria used the best-response correspondence. The
best response correspondence mapped the set of independent mixed actions to itself.
In the empirical-evidence setting, these actions are replaced by strategies, and Fm
plays a similar role to the best-response correspondence.
5.7.1 Existence of Approximate Equilibria
Theorem 6. Let m = (mi)i∈I be models and ε = (εi)i∈I be positive numbers.
There exists an (ε,m) EEE.
Proof. First, show that Fm,ε has a fixed point. The set of strategies is representable by
a product of simplices. Therefore, Fm,ε is a mapping from a convex and compact set to
itself. By Propositions 6 and 7, FO,m,ε and FM,m are continuous. As the composition of
two continuous functions, Fm,ε is continuous. By application of Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem, Fm,ε has a fixed point.
The upcoming Proposition 5 therefore implies that an (ε,m) EEE exists.
Proposition 5. Let m = (mi)i∈I be models and ε = (εi)i∈I be positive numbers.
Let σ∗ be a fixed point of Fm,ε. Define µ∗ by µ∗ = FM,m(σ∗).
The pair (µ∗, σ∗) is an (ε,m) EEE.
Proof. Fix i ∈ I. By definition predictor µ∗ is (σ∗,mi) consistent with Ni. Note that
FO,m,ε(µ∗) = FO,m,ε ◦FM,m(σ∗) = Fm,ε(σ∗) = σ∗.
This implies that strategy σ∗ is (εi, µ
∗
i ,mi) optimal. Therefore, (µ
∗, σ∗) is an (ε,m) EEE.
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Proposition 6. Let m = (mi)i∈I be models and ε = (εi)i∈I be positive numbers.
The optimization mapping FO,m,ε is continuous.
Proof. Agent i’s predictor only affects agent i’s strategy. Therefore, proving that FO,m,ε
is continuous, only requires showing that FO,m,εi : µi 7→ σi is continuous for all i ∈ I.




it is sufficient to prove that (a) and (b) are continuous.
The upcoming Lemma 1 shows that the value function of a finite MDP is a
continuous function of the parameters of the problem. Since µi is one of the parameters
of the MDP whose value function is U∗i , (a) is continuous. It was noted in Section 5.5
that (b) is continuous.
Proposition 7. Let m = (mi)i∈I be models.
The modeling mapping FM,m is continuous.
Proof. Agent i’s strategy impacts all the agents’ predictors. Proving the continu-
ity of FM,m, requires showing that FM,mi,j : σi 7→ µj is continuous for all i, j ∈ I.





it is sufficient to prove that (c), (d), and (e) are continuous.
The elements (σi(xi, zi))xi∈Xi,zi,∈Ziare entries in the matrix Tσ. Therefore (c) is
linear, hence continuous. [33, Theorem 4.1] shows that the stationary distribution
of a finite irreducible Markov chain is a continuous function of the elements of its
transition matrix, which proves that (d) is continuous. It was noted in Section 5.5
that (e) is continuous.
The result in [33, Theorem 4.1] targets finite irreducible Markov chains. Therefore,
the proof of Proposition 7 immediately holds when using weak consistency. The
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following observation allows to accommodate eventual consistency as well. Consider a
finite unichain Markov chain with communication class C. Label the states such that
the states in C come before the other ones. Let T be the transition matrix for this
Markov chain. It has the following block structure:T ′ 0
A B

where T ′ is the transition matrix for an irreducible Markov chain on C. Denote by π
and π′ the stationary distributions of T and T ′. These stationary distributions coincide
on C, which in block notation is denoted by π = (π′0). First, the function T 7→ T ′
is a projection and therefore continuous. Then, the function T ′ 7→ π′ is continuous
according to [33, Theorem 4.1]. Finally, the function π′ 7→ π = (π′0) is trivially
continuous. This guarantees that Proposition 7 holds when using eventual consistency
or eventual weak consistency.
Lemma 1 (Continuity of the Value Function in the Parameters of an MDP). Consider
a finite MDP described by a dynamic x+ ∼ f(x, a), a utility function u(x, a), and
a discount factor δ. Denote by θ the finite vector of parameters of the problem. It
corresponds to all the entries in f and u. Let Bθ be the Bellman operator associated
with the problem. By definition, the value function of the problem U∗θ is the fixed point
of Bθ, U∗θ = BθU
∗
θ .
The function θ 7→ U∗θ is continuous.
Proof. Let θ and θ′ be two vectors of parameters corresponding to two MDPs. Let U∗θ
and U∗θ′ be the value functions associated with these MDPs. We will show that U
∗
θ
converges to U∗θ′ as θ converges to θ
′ by showing that ‖U∗θ − U∗θ′‖ converges to 0.
The value function U∗θ is a fixed point of Bθ. The Bellman operator Bθ is a
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contraction mapping with Lipschitz constant δ. As a result,
‖U∗θ − U∗θ′‖ = ‖BθU∗θ − U∗θ′‖
≤ ‖BθU∗θ −BθU∗θ′‖ + ‖BθU∗θ′ − U∗θ′‖





We will now prove that the function θ 7→ BθU∗θ′ is continuous because each of its
finitely many components is continuous. By definition, (BθU∗θ′)(x) = maxa∈A v(x, a, θ),
where v(x, a, θ) = u(x, a)+ δf(x, a)>U∗θ′ . For fixed x and a, θ 7→ v(x, a, θ) is linear and
therefore continuous. For a fixed x, θ 7→ BθU∗θ′(x) is the maximum of a finite number
of continuous functions and as such is continuous. Therefore, the function θ 7→ BθU∗θ′
is continuous.
As a result, as θ converges to θ′, BθU∗θ′ converges to Bθ′U
∗
θ′ . Since U
∗
θ′ is a fixed
point of Bθ′ , BθU∗θ′ converges to U
∗
θ′ . We have proven that limθ→θ′‖BθU∗θ′ − U∗θ′‖ = 0.
Finally, (30) implies that ‖U∗θ − U∗θ′‖ goes to zero as θ goes to θ′ which concludes the
proof.
5.7.2 Existence of Exact Equilibria
Theorem 7. Let m = (mi)i∈I be models.
There exists an exact m EEE.
Proof. This proof follows closely the proof of the existence of an exact Nash equilibrium.
An exact optimization counterpart to Proposition 5 is easily established. It
guarantees that strategies σ ∈ Σ forming a fixed point of Fm, corresponds to an
m EEE. Therefore, proving the existence of such a fixed point is a sufficient condition
to proving the theorem.
To apply Kakutani’s fixed point theorem we need to prove the four following facts:
• The set Σ is non-empty, compact and a convex subset of an Euclidean space.
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• For σ ∈ Σ, Fm(σ) is non-empty.
• For σ ∈ Σ, Fm(σ) is convex.
• The Fm correspondence has a closed graph.
The first fact was already proven. The following two are immediate application of
dynamic-programming results for finite MDPs with discounted cost. The definition
of the set Fm(σ) through the Bellman equation guarantees its non-emptiness and
convexity.
Let us prove that the Fm correspondence has a closed graph. The function FM,m
is continuous. The composition of a continuous function with a correspondence
with a closed graph is also a correspondence with a closed graph. Therefore, it is
sufficient to show that the FO,m correspondence has a closed graph. Let σ = (σt)t∈N
and µ = (µt)t∈N be sequences of strategies and predictors such that for all t in N,
σt ∈ FO,m(µt). Suppose that σ converges to σ∗ and µ converges to µ∗. Let i be
an agent, xi ∈ Xi, and zi ∈ Zi. For t ∈ N, the fact that σt ∈ FO,m(µt) implies




i). This translates to

















) ∣∣xi, zi, ai, s+i ]],
where Uµti is the value function of the MDP induced by µ
t
i. The arguments used in
the proof of the existence of an approximate equilibrium show that the right-hand
side is a continuous function of µti. Therefore, in the limit,

















) ∣∣xi, zi, ai, s+i ]],




i ). This fact is true for any agent and therefore F
O,m
has a closed graph.
Everything is now in place to apply Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem and to conclude
that an exact m EEE always exists.
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This is the second time Brouwer’s theorem is used before using Kakutani’s to prove
the existence of an exact equilibrium. This two-step process is centered around the
continuity required by Brouwer’s theorem. This continuity guarantees that, when a
sequence of strategies is optimal with respect to a sequence of parameters, if both
sequences converge, then the optimality is still true in the limit. There is not much
to gain by using directly Kakutani’s theorem as the core of the proof is shared with
Brouwer’s.
The following section characterizes empirical-evidence equilibria in the setting of
perfect-monitoring repeated games.
5.8 Exogenous Empirical-evidence Equilibria in Perfect-monitoring
Repeated Games
Having defined a new equilibrium concept, we wanted to compare it with existing
ones. We focused on repeated games as these are the most studied stochastic games.
Along the way, we found a partial characterization of EEEs in perfect-monitoring
repeated games.
Consider a two-player perfect-monitoring repeated game with utilities u1 : A → R,
u2 : A → R and discount factors δ1 and δ2. In this game, the agents are using exogenous
models m1 and m2. Since there is no state in a repeated game, it means that mi
only depends on zi and s
+
i but not ai. The associated agent knowledge diagrams are
depicted in Figure 38.
The following proposition shows that, in the present setting, optimality is achievable
with a strategy using only the last value of the model state instead of the whole history.
Proposition 8. Let i be an agent, µi : Zi → ∆(A−i) be a predictor, and σi : Zi →
∆(Ai) be a strategy such that the following condition holds:
∀zi ∈ Zi, ∀a′i ∈ Ai, E[ui(σi(zi), µi(zi))] ≥ E[ui(a′i, µi(zi))].




















































































(c) System M1 in the exogenous empirical-evidence setting
Figure 38: Agent knowledge in a two-player perfect-monitoring repeated game. The
highlighted signal highlights how the consistency condition ties N and M1 together.
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Proof. The expected payoff at time t depends on the model state zti and the action a
t
i.
Since the action has no impact on the model state, myopic optimization is sufficient
to guarantee global optimality.
Theorem 8. Let the pair (µ, σ) be an exogenous empirical-evidence equilibrium (xEEE)
for the game (u, δ) with mockups m. Let π be the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain over the model states z induced by σ and m.
The pair (π, σ) is a correlated equilibrium for the one-shot game described by u.
In particular, when all the agents use a memoryless model, the pair (π, σ) is a
Nash equilibrium for u.
The careful choice of definitions in the previous sections makes the proof of this
theorem straightforward. The key insight of the proof is to interpret the model state zi
as the type of agent i.
Proof. Fix an agent i. Pick a state zi ∈ Zi and a signal s+i = a−i ∈ Si. By definition
of an xEEE, the predictor µi is consistent with m and σ. The consistency condition
for state zi and signal a−i can be rewritten as follows:













= Eπ[σ−i(z−i)[a−i] | zi]
= EZ∼π[σ−i(Z−i)[a−i] |Zi = zi],
where σ−i(z−i)[a−i] denotes
∏
j∈−i σj(zj)[aj]. This equality holds for any a−i, therefore,
µi(zi) = EZ∼π[σ−i(Z−i) |Zi = zi].
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Pick an action a′i ∈ Ai. By definition of an xEEE, the strategy σi is optimal
with respect to µi. Substituting the expression for µi(zi) in the optimality condition
of Proposition 8 gives the following inequality:
EZ∼π[ui(σi(zi), σ−i(z−i)) |Zi = zi] ≥ EZ∼π[ui(a′i, σ−i(z−i)) |Zi = zi].
Interpreting zi as the type of agent i in Proposition 1 guarantees that the pair (π, σ)
is a correlated equilibrium for u.
The following section illustrates this result.
5.8.1 An Example
In the hawk-dove game, two agents compete for a prize of value 6. The actions of each
agent are to be aggressive or passive. In a biological analogy, the aggressive action is
called hawk and the passive action is called dove. If only one agent is aggressive, this
agent gets the prize to itself. If both agents are aggressive, a fight ensues and both
agents are hurt. Finally, if both agents are passive, they split the prize equally. This
story is encoded in the following normal-form game:
h d
H −1,−1 6, 0
D 0, 6 3, 3 .
(31)
The actions of agent 1 are represented by the uppercase letters H and D. Those
of agent 2 by their lowercase counterparts h and d. Recall that the actions of one
agent are the signals of the other. Using uppercase and lowercase helps in avoiding
confusion.
The analysis of the best-response correspondences yields Figure 39. The hawk-dove
game has two pure Nash equilibria (H, d) and (D, h), and one mixed Nash equilibrium




















Figure 39: Best responses and Nash equilibria for hawk-dove. Agent 1 plays H with
probability p1. Agent 2 plays h with probability p2. The solid line is agent 1’s best response.
The dashed line is agent 2’s best response. The filled circles indicate the Nash equilibria.
Let us construct an xEEE implementing a correlated-equilibrium distribution.
The correlated-equilibrium distribution chosen is the average of the two pure Nash
equilibria α = 1
2
(H, d) + 1
2
(D, h). The set of correlated-equilibrium distributions
is a non-empty convex set containing all the Nash equilibria. Therefore, α is a
correlated-equilibrium distribution, even though it is not a Nash equilibrium. Given
the symmetric nature of the game, we chose to implement a symmetric equilibrium,
meaning that the strategies of the two agents are identical. As a consequence, their
predictors are also identical. Both agents use the previously-mentioned depth-2 model.
Let us describe what the solution looks like from agent 1’s perspective. Agent 1’s




, where a2 is the latest observed action of agent 2 and a
−
2 the one
before that. If agent 1 sees that agent 2 alternates its actions, it supposes that agent 2
acts according to the plan and that this alternation will continue. If agent 2 uses the
same action twice in a row, agent 1 is unsure about agent 2’s behavior. According to
these predictions, agent 1 builds optimal or approximately optimal strategies.
Let us now fill in the details. We provide three variations associated with eventual
consistency, consistency, and a new concept called approximate consistency.
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5.8.1.1 Eventual Consistency
The first variation is closest to the story previously described. The agents use the
following predictors associated with their depth-2 models:
µ1(d, h) = d,
































A pair of associated optimal strategies is
σ1(d, h) = H,
































These strategies induce a Markov chain over the state space Z1 ×Z2 = A22 ×A21. By
computing the transition matrix, one verifies that this Markov chain is unichain and
periodic with period two. Its communication class is {(h, d,D,H), (d, h,H,D)}. In the































In the limit, 14 out of the 16 states do not appear. In particular, any state in which
























∣∣ zt2 = (H,D)] = 1.
(33)
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Equation (32) guarantees that states (h, h) and (d, d) vanish. Therefore, the values
of µ1(h, h) and µ1(d, d) are arbitrary. The values of µ1(d, h) and µ1(h, d) match the
values observed in (33). Therefore, the predictors are eventually consistent.
Let us now look at the optimality condition. Eventual consistency allows for the
predictors to take arbitrary values on transient states (h, h) and (d, d). Therefore, we
chose values helping with the optimality condition. The values chosen correspond
to the mixed Nash equilibrium in which the agents are indifferent between their two
actions. Agent 1 responds optimally in each of the four states z1.
Therefore, we have constructed an exact xEEE with the notion of eventual consis-
tency which implements the desired correlated-equilibrium distribution.
5.8.1.2 Consistency
Let us now go from eventual consistency to consistency. The agents use strategies
σ1(d, h) = 0.999 H + 0.001 D,
















σ2(D,H) = 0.999 h + 0.001 d,















The induced Markov chain over Z1 × Z2 is irreducible and aperiodic. No state is
transient. Therefore, predictors have to be defined for all states. The consistent
predictors are
µ1(d, h) = 0.996 d + 0.004 h,
µ1(h, d) = 0.996 h + 0.004 d,
µ1(h, h) = 0.5 h + 0.5 d,
µ1(d, d) = 0.5 h + 0.5 d,
and
µ2(D,H) = 0.996 D + 0.004 H,
µ2(H,D) = 0.996 H + 0.004 D,
µ2(H,H) = 0.5 H + 0.5 D,
µ2(D,D) = 0.5 H + 0.5 D.
The probabilities reported as 0.5 are not exactly 1
2
. These probabilities are biased
towards the symbol just observed twice with a bias of the order of 10−12.
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In this setting, consistency is immediate, by definition of the predictors. Optimality
is slightly trickier. Recall that in an xEEE for a perfect-monitoring repeated game,
the optimality condition translates to myopic optimality. Therefore, σ1’s optimality
with respect to µ1 and m1 is equivalent to the following condition. For all z1 ∈ Z1,
agent 1’s mixed action σ1(z1) is a best response to agent 2’s mixed action µ1(z1).
This is not the case for the states (d, d) and (h, h). As seen in Figure 39, agent 1’s
sole best-response to 0.5 h + 0.5 d is H. However, σ1 is approximately optimal with
respect to µ1 for discount factors δ1 close enough to one. Most of the time is spent in
states (d, h) and (h, d) for which σ1 is optimal. By taking δ1 close enough to one, the
effect of acting non-optimally in the other two states becomes negligible.
Proposition 8 proves that myopic optimality is sufficient to get optimality. This
example illustrates that approximate optimality does not require approximate myopic
optimality. Strategies can perform poorly on vanishing states.
The resulting equilibrium is an approximate xEEE. The associated distribution
over actions
0.004 (H, h) 0.496 (H, d)
0.496 (D, h) 0.004 (D, d)
,
is an approximation of the desired correlated-equilibrium distribution.
5.8.1.3 Approximate Consistency
To conclude this example, let us analyze what happens when approximately consistent
predictors are used. The agents use the same smoothed strategies
σ1(d, h) = 0.999 H + 0.001 D,
















σ2(D,H) = 0.999 h + 0.001 d,

















µ1(d, h) = 0.999 d + 0.001 h,
















µ2(D,H) = 0.999 D + 0.001 H,















These predictors are necessarily inconsistent. However, they are approximately con-
sistent, meaning close to the consistent ones. Since the strategies are approximately
optimal for the consistent predictors, Lemma 1 guarantees they are also approximately
optimal for the approximately consistent predictors. Therefore, the pair (σ, µ) forms
an approximate EEE in the sense of Definition 18.
This example explains why we did not formally define the notion of approximate
consistency. Lemma 1 guarantees that we can trade approximate consistency for
approximate optimality. For the sake of clarity, it is easier to only have approximation
in one place and we chose to have approximate optimality.
5.8.2 Average of Nash Equilibria
The example of the previous section easily extends to general finite games and yields
a large set of correlated-equilibrium distributions. Most of the work for the proof has
already been done in the example.














which is a correlated-equilibrium distribution.
For large enough discount factors (δi)i∈I, α is implementable by an approxi-
mate xEEE, in which each agent uses a depth-k eventually consistent model.
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−i, · · · , ak−2−i , ak−1−i
)
= ak−i,







As opposed to the example, a mixed Nash equilibrium does not always exist. This
reduced flexibility in defining the predictor on vanishing states, explains why only
approximate xEEEs are guaranteed.




















−i, · · · , ak−2−i , ak−1−i
)
= aki ,







For a vanishing state zi, the definition of µi(zi) could have been anything. The
definition of σi(zi) requires that each action appearing in one of the k pure Nash
equilibria appear with positive probability.
The induced Markov chain is unichain and periodic with period k. Its communica-
tion class has k states corresponding to each of the k Nash equilibria. In the limit,
the chain cycles through these k states in the order imposed by the labeling of the
equilibria. The eventual consistency of the predictors is proven as in the example.
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As previously mentioned, it is not always possible to guarantee optimality of σi
with respect to µi. However, σi is optimal for all the states visited in the limit. The
lack of optimality is only for vanishing states. Therefore, a large enough discount
factor guarantees approximate optimality.














which is a correlated-equilibrium distribution.
For large enough discount factors (δi)i∈I, α can be approximated by a correlated-
equilibrium distribution induced by an approximate xEEE, in which each agent uses a
depth-k consistent model.
Proof. Let i ∈ I be an agent and ε > 0. Denote by ωi the uniform distribution





−i, · · · , ak−1−i , ak−i
)





−i, · · · , ak−i, a1−i
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−i, · · · , ak−2−i , ak−1−i
)
= (1− ε)aki + εωi,
and for all the other states zi,






The joint strategy σ = (σi)i∈I induces an irreducible aperiodic Markov chain.
Define µ = (µi)i∈I as the associated consistent predictors.
Using the same proofs as in the example, one shows that, for ε small enough, the
pair (σ, µ) forms an approximate xEEE. Furthermore, this construction induces an
approximation of the correlated-equilibrium distribution α.
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5.9 Learning Empirical-evidence Equilibria
5.9.1 A Learning Rule
The fixed points of Gm,ε are (ε,m) EEEs. A natural approach to try and learn
an (ε,m) EEE is to use an adaptive rule that converges to fixed points. Consider the
following adaptive rule:









where αt is a step size. The long-run behavior of (34) is related to properties of the
following differential equation:
µ̇ = Gm,ε(µ)− µ. (35)
In particular, Benäım showed that the limit set of (34) is a connected set internally
chain recurrent for the flow induced by Gm,ε− Id, where Id is the identity function [5].
The following, easily verified, proposition tells us that, if (34) converges, it might yield
an (ε,m) EEE.
Proposition 9. The fixed points of Gm,ε are connected sets internally chain recurrent
for the flow induced by Gm,ε − Id.
Note, however, that these fixed points might not be the only connected sets
internally chain recurrent for this flow.
The existence of a Lyapunov function for (35) guarantees that there is a unique
connected sets internally chain recurrent for the flow induced by Gm,ε − Id which is
the equilibrium point. Therefore, if there exists such a Lyapunov function for the
continuous system, we can conclude that (34) converges to an EEE.
5.9.2 Simulation Results
This learning rule was successfully used on a simplified market example. Two agents can
hold a quantity of a single asset between 0 and 4, X = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. At each time step,
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each agent can sell one asset, buy one asset, or hold its position, A = {Sell,Hold,Buy}.
The assets can be traded at a low price or at a high price, S = {Low,High}. Nature
exogenously determines the market trend as a bull market or a bear market, W =
S × {Bear,Bull}. The price is impacted by the past price, the market trend, and the
orders placed by the two agents. A high price in the past, buying orders, or a bull
market increase the chances of seeing a high price in the future. The agents receive
the price at each time step but are not aware of the price dynamic. In this model,
they are not even aware of the existence of the market trend. The two agents use a
discount factor δ = 0.95.
Agent 1 starts with the idea that the price will be high with probability 1. Agent 2
starts with the idea that the price will be low with probability 1. Each agent is trying
to learn a depth-0 model of the price. Two versions of (34) were simulated. The first
one used (34) directly with a fixed step size of αt = 0.1. The stationary distribution πσ
was computed at each time step to obtain the true value of Gm,ε(µt). The algorithm is
presented in Algorithm 3. The results of the simulations using the theoretical predictor
are presented in Figure 40. Since the price is a public signal, after a transient phase
due to the step size, the predictions of both agents agree. The prediction converges to
probability of seeing a high price of 0.431. The two agents use the same strategy that
is the optimal response for that prediction of the price. When the price is high sell.
When the price is low, sell when having four units, hold when having three units, and
buy otherwise. The learning rule has indeed converged to an EEE.
In the second simulated version of (34), the stationary distribution is only estimated
by playing 100 rounds of the game at each time step. Because of the variance induced






The estimated predictors obtained in that case are denoted by µ̂ti. The algorithm is
presented in Algorithm 4. The results of the simulation using the empirical predictors
are presented in Figure 41. Estimating, instead of using the true probability, induces
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some variations. The learning rule does not converge, but oscillates around the EEE



















Figure 40: Simulation results of two agents learning a depth-0 model of the price for the



















Figure 41: Simulation results of two agents learning a depth-0 model of the price for the
market example with an empirical predictor.
5.9.3 Effect of the Finite Observation Window
In the empirical simulation, approximate predictors are used. The function FM,m
computes predictors consistent with given strategies through the stationary distribution
of a Markov chain. The function FM,ml is obtained when approximate predictors are
instead computed from l rounds of play. The following proposition shows that
important properties of FM,m are recovered by FM,ml , as l goes to infinity. A proof
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Algorithm 3 Learning with Theoretical Predictor
procedure Theoretical Predictor Learning(ε)
µ1 ← 1
µ2 ← 0
for t ∈ [1, 100] do
σ1 ← an optimal strategy for µ1
σ2 ← an optimal strategy for µ2
Tσ ← the transition matrix for the Markov chain induced by σ1 and σ2
πσ ← the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1 for Tσ
µ̂← Pπσ [High]
µ1 ← µ1 + 0.1(µ̂− µ1)
µ2 ← µ2 + 0.1(µ̂− µ2)
end for
end procedure
Algorithm 4 Learning with Empirical Predictor
procedure Empirical Predictor Learning(ε)
µ1 ← 1
µ2 ← 0
for t ∈ [1, 100] do
σ1 ← an optimal strategy for µ1
σ2 ← an optimal strategy for µ2
h← 0
for τ ∈ [1, 100] do
agent 1 places an order according to σ1
agent 2 places an order according to σ2





















sketch for this proposition is given to highlight useful tools in this context. Given a
real problem, the proposition can be adapted, using the appropriate textbook material
on stochastic approximation and Lyapunov stability of perturbed systems.
Assumption 4. When computing FM,ml , at the beginning of the l rounds of play, the
state of Nature w, the states of the agents x, the state of the models z, and the seed to
the pseudorandom number generators are reset.
Proposition 10. Under Assumption 4, if there exists a Lyapunov function for the
following continuous-time system:
µ̇ = Gm,ε(µ)− µ, (36)
then for l large enough, the following discrete-time system, using approximate predictors,
converges to an EEE:









where Gm,εl = F
M,m
l ◦FO,m,ε and (αt)t∈N is a non summable but square summable
sequence of positive numbers.
The proof starts with the use of dynamical system
˙̂µ = Gm,εl (µ̂)− µ̂, (38)
and results on Lyapunov stability of perturbed systems such as [26, Lemma 9.1 or
Lemma 9.2]. For a large enough l, dependent on the chosen lemma, (38) constitutes a
perturbed version of (36). Therefore, for l large enough, a Lyapunov function for (36)
is also a Lyapunov function for (38). The existence of a Lyapunov function for (38)
implies that the only connected set internally chain recurrent for the flow induced by
Gm,εl − Id is the singleton containing the equilibrium point. Assumption 4 allows the
application of deterministic stochastic-approximation results. In particular, [5, Th. 1.2]
guarantees that the limit set of the sequence (µ̂t)t∈N, solution to (37), is a connected set






We developed the framework of EEEs in stochastic games. This research started by
trying to apply game-theoretic results to decentralized control. Using game theory to
design a controller entails computing equilibrium strategies for a specific game. For
decentralized controllers, computing the strategies in a decentralized fashion through
learning is an undeniable advantage. Stochastic games are of particular interest for
controls since they extend MDPs. However, the computation of equilibrium strategies
in stochastic games is an open problem. The main reason for this lack of result is
that computing equilibrium strategies in a general stochastic game requires each agent
to solve a POMDP. As previously exposed, this issue stems from the full rationality
requirement imposed by classical game theory. With this consideration in mind, this
research was steered towards bounded rationality. In stochastic games, bounded
rationality commonly appears in the form of consistency. Agents using consistency are
not required to have perfect understanding of their environment but only a statistically
consistent understanding.
In this dissertation, we laid down the foundations of a general consistency frame-
work. In this framework, EEEs have emerged as a solution concept. We proved the
existence of EEEs for a general setting. We provided a characterization of EEEs in
perfect-monitoring repeated games. Finally, we explored the learning of EEEs with a
particular interest for the finite observation window case. Some other interesting open
questions are listed below.
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6.1 Implications of Using Consistency
The fact that agents use consistent models in EEEs diminishes the amount of compu-
tation they require to obtain optimal strategies. However, it also imposes constraints
on the attainable equilibria and associated strategies. The first step to understand
those constraints is to analyze the simplest notion of consistency, which is depth-k
consistency.
What impact does varying k have? Eyster and Piccione gave an answer in a specific
setting where the strategies of the agents did not impact the environment [13]. Since
a depth-k consistent model is depth-k− 1 consistent as well, a larger k is synonymous
with better understanding of the environment. They proved that agents with a larger k
did not always receive a larger payoff. This question has to be addressed for a more
general setting.
As k increases, the agent gets a more accurate prediction of the strings of signals.
This raises the question to know what happens in the limit.
6.2 Large Number of Agents
In a mean-field game, agents face identical problems and impact their opponents
through the empirical distribution of states of all the agents. An MFE is an equilibrium
in which these agents use depth-0 consistency. These MFEs are studied when the
number of agents is large. Restricting the attention to this specific setting with a
large number of agents allows for the derivation of strong results. The main result
states that as the number of agents grows to infinity, an MFE converges to a Nash
equilibrium. In other words, the approximation made by the agents regarding the
empirical distribution of states does not change the behavior of the system. This
result is a consequence of the central limit theorem and it would be interesting to
generalize it to a broader setting.
In the MFE setting, the agents are homogeneous and impact their opponents only
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through their state. The EEE framework lifts these two restrictions. In particular
the impact agents have on their opponents is embedded in the signal definition. Can
results from the MFE literature be extended to the broader framework of EEEs? In
particular, the EEEs framework offers the opportunity to explore the consequences of
the central limit theorem for a broader class of consistency than the sole depth-0.
6.3 Learning
EEEs were informally defined as fixed points of a simple iterative process. The existence
of fixed points has been established. However, the convergence of the iterative process
to such a fixed point is not guaranteed. Building a learning rule converging to EEEs
can be done in two steps. First, a theoretical learning rule converging to EEEs is
designed. Then, a practical online version of the rule is derived. This approach was
used in the simulations of Section 5.9. The theoretical learning rule uses the stationary
distribution of the whole system. This information is not available to the agents
as they play but it matches closely the requirements of EEEs. However, the agents
can estimate the stationary distribution of the system by observing the play long
enough. Hart and Mas-Colell used this two-step approach to prove the convergence of
an adaptive no-regret learning rule to correlated equilibria [20]. The adaptive learning
rule replaced a matrix inversion step by a simpler maximization one.
6.4 Price of Anarchy
Given a global objective, a multiagent system can be controlled by a centralized or
a decentralized controller. In a centralized approach, an optimal controller for the
objective is computed offline. Each agent is then given to execute a part of this
controller. In a decentralized approach using game theory, each agent is given a utility
function along with a learning rule. In this case, the controller corresponds to the
equilibrium reached by the learning process. The decentralized approach is more
robust and scalable than the centralized approach. However, these advantages come
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with a cost; the decentralized controller is suboptimal. For systems whose global
objective coincide with maximizing the sum of the utility functions, this cost can be
evaluated by a metric called the price of anarchy [27]. The sum of the utility functions
of the agents is called the social welfare, and the ratio of social welfare between the
decentralized and centralized controllers is considered. The price of anarchy is the
worst case ratio. In a learning context, the ratio is a random variable and properties
other than its minimum value can be computed. This notion, classically defined for
Nash equilibria, readily extends to EEEs. What is the price of anarchy for EEEs?
6.5 Payoff Folk Theorem
Payoff folk theorems for repeated games prove that all the feasible individually strictly
rational payoff profiles are sustainable by subgame-perfect equilibria. This implies
that subgame-perfect equilibria sustain almost all payoff profiles. Some of these payoff
profiles are undesirable, for example the non-Pareto-optimal ones. Do EEEs sustain
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to pursue a Bachelor of Science in Electrical and Computer Engineering. He graduated
first in his class in 2007.
When he is not in the lab, Nicolas can be found contributing to open-source
projects, playing tennis, cooking or spending time with his wife, Laura, and infant
daughter, Claire.
128
